

PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN DECISIONMAKING

SULLIVANS COVE, TASMANIA

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STATEMENT

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university and to the best of the author's knowledge and belief the thesis contains no copy or paraphrase of material previously published or written by other persons except when due reference is made in the text of the thesis.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Shelley Cohn". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, looped 'S' and a trailing flourish.

ABSTRACT

This thesis follows the progress of two controversial development projects in an historic waterfront precinct in the city of Hobart, Tasmania, Australia. The thesis examines the public participation processes in these developments and compares the effectiveness of public involvement with that found in a review of literature on public participation in planning. A brief outline of participation in the United States, Great Britain and Australia and its evolution is included. The dilemmas of public participation, including the lack of opportunities for 'real' participation and the perceived benefits for those who actually participate, are highlighted. Some recommendations are provided to guide authorities and participants in applying participation principles to planning proposals.

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PREFACE

This thesis is comprised of five chapters. An explanation of the format is appropriate.

Chapter 1 introduces Sullivans Cove to the reader and describes the method of the thesis. It establishes Sullivans Cove as an important historic precinct with a unique heritage that is under pressure from development proposals. This thesis is submitted at a time when heritage values are undergoing a resurgence in popularity.

Chapter 2 presents an overview of contemporary literature on public participation to be found in relevant journals and other publications. This chapter forms the basis from which analysis of the case studies proceed. The overseas experience presented in this chapter is related, in subsequent chapters, to two development projects in Sullivans Cove, Tasmania, Australia.

Chapters 3 and 4 form the main body of data for this thesis. The data is discussed in the section Analysis of Participation found at the end of both chapters. This discussion is consolidated and further analysed in chapter 5. Chapter 5 also includes final recommendations arising from the findings of this thesis.

The essence of this thesis and its line of argument can be traced without detailed consideration of the case studies presented in chapters 3 and 4. The Summary and Analysis of Participation found at the end of each case study will inform the reader, in sufficient detail, of the sequence of events in these two developments. The case studies are included so that the historical perspective is not lost to future generations. This thesis, as far as the author is aware, is the only documented history of events for these two controversial developments in Sullivans Cove.

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1. Sullivans Cove and Various Interests

The future of Sullivans Cove as a historical site is under seige. Indeed, the battle to preserve its unique buildings, facilities, character and ambience already may have been lost.....

The fundamental prerequisite for the conservation of a significant place is that its form and character, being of historic, architectural, social, scientific or aesthetic importance, should be preserved and enhanced. Once the rate of change in that character or fabric of a place becomes so rapid that it no longer feels familiar, then that value is lost, usually forever (The Mercury; 26/8/87).

Sullivans Cove is Hobart's waterfront 'doorstep' and a principal site of Tasmania's early colonial development. Hobart was founded, at Sullivans Cove, in 1804 by Lieutenant David Collins. The urban character of Sullivans Cove became an integral part of Hobart's identity. It has been acclaimed for its architectural charm and is one of the city's unique attractions.

Hobart has been described (The Bulletin; 26/4/88) as being second only to Sydney in Australian history, and in many ways as being much more delightful. Hobart is different from other cities in Australia in that much of the private development remains on a small to medium scale, often respecting the older buildings or adapting them to contemporary use. The main urban design problems have been caused by the Federal and State Governments and their instrumentalities.

At present there are no coordinated plans for Sullivans Cove although the Battery Point Planning Scheme, the provisional City of Hobart Planning Scheme and various other studies focussing on the Cove cover the area. There are many government and private agencies wanting to control, and be involved with any redevelopment that may occur. The area is becoming popular for many reasons including its proximity to the city centre.

During the mid-1980s, in particular, a number of development proposals, having little or no regard for the preservation of the historical character of Sullivans Cove were implemented. These proposals included the Sheraton International Hotel, the Marine Board's control tower, the Centre for the Arts, the Executive offices in Murray Street, Mure's Fish Centre, the recycling of Gibson's City Mill, the redevelopment of the MTT Bus Depot, and the recycling of 60 per cent of the warehouses in Salamanca Place. Projects in the 'pipeline' included Hobart City Council's 'City Square' development and the Antarctic Museum proposal for Salamanca Place (The Mercury; 26/8/87). Some of these developments have been more controversial than others. The Sheraton International Hotel, a State (Liberal) Government initiated project, inspired enormous public outcry resulting in the mobilisation of different bodies claiming to represent the interests of Sullivans Cove.

The Sheraton International Hotel debate encouraged the State Government to appoint the Sullivans Cove Development Association as its advisory body on Sullivans Cove. Its tasks were to raise awareness of the importance of Sullivans Cove to the city of Hobart, and encourage revitalisation of the area. It was jointly funded by the major landowners in Sullivans Cove: the Marine Board, the Hobart City Council and the State Government although its members were drawn from a range of agencies with interests in the Sullivans Cove area. Its advice would be based on consultants' studies such as the Sullivans Cove Urban Design Study (SCUDS) 1983, the Sullivans Cove Landscaping and Streetscaping Works (Davey Street and International Hotel environs) 1986 and the Sullivans Cove Urban Detail and Bicentennial Walking Trail Study 1988.

The Sullivans Cove Development Authority has the role of implementing planning policy but has no statutory power and its effectiveness depends entirely upon the cooperation and coordination of the various agencies involved. Some feel this Authority has less than ideal control over the opposing interests and future of Sullivans Cove as shown by the scale and nature of development taking place there (The Mercury; 26/8/87).

The Sullivans Cove Citizens Association was formed in 1986 through the initiative of members of the earlier Sullivans Cove Citizens Committee which had been formed

to express community opinions on the development of the international hotel. The Sullivans Cove Citizens Association expanded its concerns from the international hotel to the Civic Square project, the Antarctic Centre and limitations on building heights. Its membership is comprised of private members and nominees of affiliated organisations including the National Trust, the Art Society, the Archaeology Society, the Centre for the Arts, the Museums Association and professional fishermen. The Hobart City Council has given it the status of a 'neighbour' - to be informed without request of any development submission related to the Cove. It is currently concerned with a strategy plan by the Sullivans Cove Development Authority and the future role and structure of the Authority presently under government review.

Another interested community organisation, Citizens for Hobart, arose from a public meeting - 'Hobart: A City in Crisis' - attended by 250 people in the Hobart Town Hall on 24 November, 1989. The meeting was called partly as a result of the outcry over the Hobart City Council's proposed Civic Square project. Citizens for Hobart was concerned at the directions in which new development was taking the city and wished to provide a vehicle for the 'real involvement of residents in planning the future of the city. It seeks the early, active and continuing involvement of residents in guiding the future of the city and the establishment of avenues for effective citizen participation, including comprehensive community discussion' (Citizens for Hobart Newsletter, Vol. 1, November, 1989).

The types of groups who want to participate in planning matters have been discussed by Alterman, Harris and Hill (1982; p. 177). They found there were three main groups of participants, as listed below. Relating the Sullivans Cove 'actors' to these groups is helpful in understanding the context of the thesis.

1. Major elites.

These groups were organisations without whose cooperation or advice the local authority would find it difficult or even impossible to adopt and implement plans. The Hobart Marine Board and the Tasmanian State Government can be classified as major elites. The Sullivans Cove Development Authority, consisting of

representatives from the major elite groups and others, may also be classed as a major elite.

2. Minor elites.

These groups are composed of voluntary organisations active in the area. Many planning authorities approach such groups in order to obtain the different opinions held within the community. The Royal Australian Institute of Architects, the Sullivans Cove Citizens Association and the Citizens for Hobart group fit this classification.

3. The Public.

Individual members of the public may also be members of major or minor elites.

Alterman, Harris and Hill (1984; p. 183) found that the planning authority was likely to view its relationship with the major elites as consultation, but similar status was not afforded voluntary bodies or members of the public at large. The Sullivans Cove experience appears to reflect these findings.

1.2. Hypothesis and Method of the Thesis

There are three linked hypotheses in this thesis.

1. The public has had little input into decisionmaking in the planning of new development in Sullivans Cove, despite appearances and an apparent willingness by authorities to improve public participation opportunities in response to pressure.

2. In line with Sandercock's (1978) arguments that the process may be more important than the product, authorities concerned with Sullivans Cove are ill-informed and unnecessarily defensive about real improvements in public participation, as people generally only want to be informed and have a 'ready opportunity to complain'.

3. The reluctance of authorities to grant real improvements in public participation may be explained by a fear that to go a little further may increase the community's

understanding to the degree that a different kind of participation is actually demanded: beyond simply having a say in a decision here and there to a questioning of democratic processes in development decisionmaking, that is, to a situation where the wider community itself wants to set the goals for development, thereby widening democratic processes and seeking power sharing.

The literature review in Chapter 2 outlines facets of the history of public participation in the United States, Great Britain and Australia. It also examines the theoretical development of public participation in order to understand the dilemmas of public participation. These include the lack of opportunities for 'real' participation and the perceived motivation of those who actually participate.

The thesis aims to discuss public participation in relation to the outcome of decisions. Public participation in both the Sheraton International Hotel and the Civic Square case studies affected the outcomes. In the case of the Sheraton International Hotel, the public outcry resulted in the modification of the original design, a compromise. In the instance of the Civic Square, the outcry resulted in a negative result with the withdrawal of the proposal by the developer. In both cases public meetings and media attention appeared to be powerful forces. Institutionalised or formal public participation processes on their own appeared to achieve very little.

The case studies of the Sheraton International Hotel and the Hobart Civic Square developments have been chosen as representative examples of two different types of decisionmaking in Sullivans Cove. A full analysis of the decisionmaking processes and the role and level of participation is given in Chapters 3 and 4 respectively. The Sheraton Hotel was a State Government initiative. It was originally to have had two eighteen storey reflective glass towers. The public protest against this scheme forced the government to compromise in the design. But the development was still exempted from normal planning processes by the State Government. (Plate 1, p. 15 illustrates the completed 'compromise' development: The Sheraton International Hotel)



Plate 1 : The Sheraton International Hotel, Davey Street, Sullivans Cove. The 'compromise' development viewed from Constitution Dock.

In contrast the Civic Square development showed an attempt by the Hobart City Council to avoid the public outcry associated with the Sheraton Hotel development. The Council encouraged public comment on the design and it was promoted as a showcase for public participation.

Sullivans Cove represents a unique piece of Australian waterfront history and heritage. Redevelopment of Sullivans Cove is seen by both private and public agencies as an opportunity to encourage more intensive use of the waterfront especially as its shipping functions have suffered a degree of decline and some have been partially relocated. Conflicts are occurring over what developments are appropriate.

Chapter 2: Literature Review: The Effectiveness of Public Participation in Planning.

Public participation in planning is akin to a game of snakes and ladders. Awaiting the unwary community on the rungs of Arnstein's Ladder of Participation are the ever larger snakes of professional pride, bureaucratic inertia, power corruption of sectional groups, and political ideology, ready to push the community down to the lower levels or right back to Square One. For participation programmes to succeed, the snakes must be recognised, but there are questions beyond this. Where is the ladder climbing anyway? Has the ladder a stable basis? Perhaps an even more fundamental question is whether the ladder is leaning on the right wall. (Clark, 1986; p. 102)

This literature review on public participation establishes a theoretical background for the two case studies. It accepts that public participation is a complex concept that has no common definition. Participants often have implicit, unrealistic and conflicting expectations and there are problems involved with distribution of material and power resources (Churchman, 1987; p. 290).

Regardless of its intent or purpose, public participation, to a greater or lesser extent, is now part of planning legislation in the United States, Great Britain and Australia. It is the subject of debate among professionals, politicians and public alike. Both the planners and the public need to continually examine what is to be gained and expected from public participation. Further, it must be recognised as an issue that is political and ideological, not value-free (Thornley, 1977; p.54).

The next section gives a 'thumbnail history' of public participation in the United States, Great Britain and Australia. More on the development of public participation theory follows as well as discussion of issues in theory and practice.

2.1. Public Participation in Planning in the United States.

Public participation in planning in the United States began in the 1950s but was transformed during the 1960s. It changed from informal consultation efforts by planners with recognised community leaders, to formal efforts at consulting the local

community. Prior to the 1960s little attempt was made by planners to involve the general public or even those particularly affected by a plan. True representation was lacking because the views and values of the selected community leaders and the planning profession were the same (Levine, 1963; p.195).

Federally legislated programs developed during the 1950s and 1960s. These programs provided funds for Citizens Advisory Committees for urban renewal programs. By the mid-1960s people found that they were not being informed of the availability of these funds or how to access them. The slogan for this program was 'maximum feasible participation for the poor'. It was interpreted by the local authorities as meaning that the poor should be employed by the program, and not be part of the decision making process (Victorian Council of Social Services, 1981; pp. 44-45).

The demand for public participation by the public in the United States can be traced at least as far back as Saul Alinsky's book Reveille for Radicals written in 1946. The civil rights movement and the National Welfare Rights Organisation benefitted from his confrontationist tactics. Alinsky saw community organisation as complementary to representative democracy. His method was to bring in a paid organiser (his foundation provided such organisers) to help build an active local political community. The organiser would bring a community together by identifying campaigns that were achievable and teaching people how to go about winning the issue. Once the group was established the organiser would leave and it would become autonomous (Cochrane, 1986; pp. 53-54).

A criticism of the Alinsky method was that specific campaigns were secondary. It was important to win to ensure the mobilisation of new organisational structures. There was also a constant search for new campaigns to win. The role of professional community organisers was not seen as consistent with democracy and the Alinsky-inspired community initiatives were not generally very successful in winning their main demands. Success depended on leadership qualities rather than on democratic involvement (Cochrane, 1986; pp. 54-55).

Urban renewal was also instrumental in the development of public participation in planning in the United States. It was the term used by local councils when large areas of inner city slum were cleared to enable the building of middle class residential units. The goal was to recolonise the inner city with 'the tax-paying, culture loving, free spending middle class' (Wilson, 1966; p. 247).

Residents affected by urban renewal forced the decisionmakers to negotiate with them by using Alinsky-style tactics. The planners felt that these tactics exacerbated rather than prevented conflict, alienated the neighbourhood from the city as a whole rather than bringing it into the normal pattern of civic action, and placed a premium on power rather than a co-operative search for the common good. The attitude of the planning establishment towards public participation was that upper and upper-middle class people were more likely to think wholistically about long-term benefits and offer positive and constructive comments, whereas the lower and lower-middle classes were more likely to see planning in terms of specific threats and short-term costs (Wilson, 1966; pp.245-247). Burke (1979; p. 68-69), in reviewing the legacy of the urban renewal concept, however, noted that it was the first governmental programme to broaden the scope of participation beyond community elites.

During the 1960s, Richard Nixon's 'War on Poverty' program consciously involved the poor in an attempt to help them help themselves. It institutionalised public participation. Community development, assisted housing, civil rights, public participation and environmental protection were now being seen as interdependent. The Federal Government responded to the increasing demands for participation by introducing relevant legislation (specifically the 1966 Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act and the 1974 Housing and Community Development Act) (Oosthuizen, 1984; pp. 204-205).

The 1960s saw the decline of the Alinsky confrontationist approach to public participation and the beginning of 'advocacy planning' in the form of legal intervention in the courts by those attempting reform. The early 1970s saw the rise of confrontation tactics again, over the Vietnam war and pollution of the environment.

Over time these tactics have developed into issue politics. It can be described as a referenda-like strategy in local government procedures.

Issue politics is described as 'direct democracy'. There are many problems associated with this form of participation. They include the lack of equity or hierarchical mechanisms installed in the technique. The location of street lighting is given the same significance as the location of a nuclear power plant and there is no recognition that majority votes often discriminate against affected minorities. People cannot be expected to be informed on every issue put to them and are often influenced by campaigns instigated by big business interests (Victorian Council of Social Services, 1981; p. 45).

2.2. Public Participation in Planning in Great Britain.

Public participation in Great Britain in the 1980s experienced the same unsuccessful results as during the 1960s and 1970s. Only the methods of encouraging participation changed over time. The public believed the decisionmaking power was being usurped by non-elected officials because the elected members seemed unable to understand the problems presented to them. There appeared to be no effective public participation mechanisms available for the public (Victorian Council of Social Services, 1981; p. 46).

The central government in Britain took a more structured approach to public participation than in the United States. It attempted to guide local authorities (through the 1964 Planning Advisory Group's Report, the 1968 Town and Country Planning Act, the 1968-9 Skeffington Committee Report, the London Airport Report, the Layfield Public Inquiry [Greater London Development Plan], the 1972 Town and Country Planning Act, and the 1975 Dobry Report [Review of the Development Control System] and others) in the processes of public participation (Victorian Council of Social Services, 1981; p. 46, Oosthuizen, 1984; p. 205). The aim was to make people aware of government, the services it offered, and how they could participate. However, making people aware of government processes also increased their demands for improvements in these processes and services.

The participation processes encouraged by central and local governments often ended in political militancy which went beyond the search for collective solutions to neighbourhood problems to ultimately challenging the councillor and officer hierarchy. When this occurred the authorities withdrew their support for the participation process and the participants would lose their contact with the local authority. Cochrane (1986; p. 60) found that once support was withdrawn, the community groups lost their power base and often became ineffectual .

2.3. Public Participation in Planning in Australia.

Public participation in planning in Australia over the past thirty years has been characterised by bureaucratic inertia, with the intentions of bureaucracy focussed on social and economic stability. Moves towards participatory democracy in Australia reacted against this inertia and sought to humanise the system (Payne, 1973; p. 26).

Payne (1973; p.26-28) found the same problems in Australia as Wilson (1966; p. 247) and others did in the United States and Britain. These included the phenomena of the poorer socio-economic groups tending to be motivated towards solving their immediate problems rather than contributing to broad social issues, and the existence of power groups such as the Chamber of Commerce and real estate institutes which were consistently able to influence policy making. Payne argued that planners and administrators needed to question how they assessed the public interest, as well as their strategies and reasons for encouraging participatory involvement.

Hamilton-Smith (1975; pp.11-12) noted that increased and widespread participation could threaten the professionalism of planners by exposing mistakes, heightening conflicts, revealing previously unconsidered evidence, questioning the goals which had been established and demonstrating weaknesses in the strategies for their achievement. He also felt it was naive to expect people to have a significant impact on policies and plans to which the public authorities had devoted massive resources.

The Australian experiment with "Green Bans" in the mid-1970s showed how people could take control of some of the decisions affecting the shape of their cities (Fogg, 1981; p. 264). Green Bans reflected some of the limitations of public participation experienced in the United States and Great Britain. For example, the movement was dependent on a charismatic leader and the prevailing economic climate. Public participation was achieved by dealing directly with the building union, the Builder's Labourers Federation (BLF) and the developers. The union would prevent work from starting on developments if it was convinced they were socially undesirable. Developers also began to consult with the union as to its opinion on proposed projects, although they were always referred back to the resident's group in the area affected and / or to the panel of architects advising the union. The BLF was led at this time by Jack Mundey, who encouraged both the resident's groups and the workers.

Critics of the Green Ban movement claimed it only maintained the status quo. The rich kept their parks intact and prosperous suburbs kept their trees. Nevertheless, the poor did not have an expressway demolish their homes or have them replaced by office blocks. Others argued that the Green Ban movement supplied grass roots pressure for the subsequent planning legislation in New South Wales and persuaded planners to give more attention to the environmental and social side of their work. Green Bans are no longer a force in Australian planning. Perceptions of the economic situation are such that union members would think more than twice before withdrawing their labour.

2.4. The Development of Participation Theory and Some Pitfalls in Practice.

By the end of the 1960s Burke and Arnstein had developed theories and strategies regarding the use and evaluation of the effectiveness of participation. Their work would be used as a base measurement for participation for the next two decades.

Burke (1968; pp. 287-294) suggested that public participation should be interpreted and used as a planning tool. He identified five public participation strategies and described how planning agencies could use them in attaining specific goals. They were: education-therapy strategy; behavioural change strategy; staff supplement strategy; cooptation; and community power strategy.

Each strategy had its own advantages and disadvantages for the planning agency. The appropriateness of any strategy would depend on the capabilities and knowledge of the staff in implementation. Staff needed the skills to handle groups and individuals, analyse community systems, identify leaders and suggest individuals who could contribute knowledge and information. They had to understand the particular conditions necessary for the success of a particular strategy. This was often difficult and lead to confusion and conflict over the need for public participation in general.

In response Arnstein developed her concept of the 'Ladder of Citizen Participation'. The 'Ladder' was a means for assessing public participation. Public participation was a term for citizen power. Without the redistribution of power, she felt participation was an empty and frustrating process (Arnstein, 1969; p. 216). She outlined eight levels of public participation. Each level corresponded with the extent of citizens' power in determining the end product: (1) Manipulation; (2) Therapy; (3) Informing; (4) Consultation; (5) Placation; (6) Partnership; (7) Delegated Power; and (8) Citizen Control (Arnstein, 1969; p. 217).

Burke endorsed Arnstein's views on participation in 1979 when he published his own variation of the 'Ladder'. The public's roles in planning were placed in the following categories: review and comment; consultation; advisory; shared decisionmaking; and controlled decisionmaking. The specific roles were determined by a variety of factors including organisational objectives and need, legislation and regulations, public pressures and demands, and the issues of the moment (Burke, 1979; p.74).

In 1979 Glass developed a theory of participation that included five general objectives to complement both the planning administration and the public's perspectives: information exchange, education, support building, decisionmaking supplement and representational input. The first three were associated with the administrative perspective, the last two reflected the public's perspective (Glass, 1979; p.182). He, like Burke, regarded no one single technique as universally applicable. Whatever technique was used depended on the situation and objectives sought. It was important to identify the objectives of participation and then select the technique.

Alterman (1982; p.297) criticised the type of strategies Glass and Burke developed because they were orientated to the planner's and administrator's point of view. She suggested that a participatory program should take into account the objectives and actions of the participants as well as the planning agency.

The 1980s saw the development of different categories of participation. Cochrane (1988; pp. 51-77) described them as the challenge from below, reform from above, and community politics as a control system. The third type, community politics as a control system, was a method with no ongoing participation implications. It was used as a once-only participation technique to curb state and local authority activity. It involved single-issue groups which disbanded when the issue was resolved.

The challenge from below was associated with radical and extreme left political views and demands for ongoing participation and social reform.

Reform from above was an attempt by local government authorities to control the process of participation.

The aim is to involve people in decision making to commit them to decisions and to generate independent activity which is not threatening but supportive and - ultimately - subordinate rather than complementary (Cochrane 1986; p. 59).

Public participation in the United Kingdom was very much involved with government reform measures. Hambleton (1988; p. 125) discussed three broad options for public service reform which were being tried by some local government authorities in Britain in the 1980s - consumerism ('getting closer to the customer'), decentralisation and the extension of local democracy.

Consumerism was seen to be the way to ward off privatisation threats and respond to an increasingly vocal population regarding public service inadequacies. By the late 1980s criticisms of the consumerist approach echoed criticisms of methods of public participation used since the 1960s. Although consumerism could provide direct consumer participation and powersharing it tended to lean toward customer relations with little serious change in participation but with much public visibility. The

established power relationship between those providing and those receiving services was not challenged (Hambleton, 1988; pp. 127-128).

Decentralisation was an attempt to make authorities more accessible to the local communities. It was similar to other attempts by local authorities to encourage public participation. Objectives of decentralisation included improving services, local accountability, distribution of resources, public support and staff development. Most of the decentralisation initiatives of the 1980s did not bring about fundamental organisational change. Some initiatives were not even seen as vehicles for radical reform and would have been firmly resisted if it had been suggested (Hambleton, 1988; pp. 133-135).

The Islington and Tower Hamlets attempts at decentralisation were outstanding examples of how devolution of services, power and resources could be visualised and implemented. The new structures have not been in place long enough to critically analyse their success or failure over time but the concept and their progress are being monitored. The Tower Hamlets local government area was divided into seven neighbourhoods with the aim of making each of the seven communities more aware of local government services and enabling a consumerist approach (Morphett, 1987; p. 124).

Islington's decentralisation efforts involved opening 24 neighbourhood offices. The intent, like that of Tower Hamlets, was to improve accessibility to services and to devolve power to the local community to control the delivery of those services but the expectations of the public could not be met in the Islington experiment. It was soon found that decentralisation did not provide the answer to the fundamental inadequacy of resources to deal with inner London's escalating problems of poverty, deprivation and homelessness. The problems were a product of wider economic pressures (du Parcq, 1987; pp. 25-27, Cochrane, 1986; p. 55).

The implementation of decentralisation did result in an improvement in services, but as Cochrane (1986; p. 75) pointed out:

For many of those dependent on local authority services, they continue to appear remarkably undemocratic even in those places where decentralisation has begun. The main measure of democracy for clients would be for their demands to be met quickly. Financial constraints in the past five years have made that less, not more, likely....

Islington and Tower Hamlets were bold experiments that could not be regarded as the norm in local government. The more widespread use of consumerism and decentralisation by local authorities offered managerial rather than political objectives in the form they were applied. They were an attempt to reform service provision rather than the organisations providing the service (Hambleton, 1988; p. 136).

Extending local democracy was seen as a necessary component in improving the poor image of local government. Public understanding and involvement in local government matters was low, and other government authorities continued to undermine the role and scope of local government (Hambleton, 1988; p. 139).

There were many ways of strengthening local democracy and all started with the view that political change was necessary. Local politics had become much more sectional, reflecting a general trend towards a more assertive society. These sectional pressures were pushing local representative democracy to expand towards more participatory forms (Hambleton, 1988; p. 138). Processes based only upon representation are limited in the goals they can achieve (Churchman, 1987; p. 295).

Churchman (1987; p. 294) found that residents who participated in local government participation processes could achieve some goals. Direct participation provided personal benefits for the residents. Residents gained a degree of authority and were able to express their needs and preferences, learned about planning and how to use the system, became more active in the community, attained leadership positions and recognition, improved their self confidence and self image, supported the project in question and achieved a certain amount of non-radical, political change. Local government was also able to achieve greater support from the participating residents. Decision making was affected by the involvement of residents, but limits

were often placed on the type of decisions open to residents, and in turn, the residents' faith was placed in the professional opinions offered to them. The result was that plans were not significantly or in essence different from the plans that would have resulted had the residents not participated. There were differences in emphasis but not in basic structure. Satisfaction with the environment was higher in the groups where there was at least some form of participation and this suggested that satisfaction was not a direct function of the quality of the environment, but was also related to feelings of competence and control.

Long and Alterman, Harris and Hill highlighted some common attitudes of government authorities during the 1970s and 1980s and the efforts made by them to minimise public participation. Long (1975; pp.91-97) found that the invitation for the public to participate in planning matters was usually badly managed. The type of participation offered and the expertise of the participants were factors in the effectiveness of the public participation process. Only a relatively small proportion of comments had any effect and some groups and types of comments had a greater effect. The late timing of most participation disallowed radical changes but early participation did not guarantee change either (Alterman, Harris and Hill, 1984; p.177, 181).

The authors attributed the lack of effectiveness of the participants' comments to several causes including: the late stage in the planning process; the participants were responding to a completed draft plan presenting a single and detailed alternative; the planners preconceptions may have been difficult to change; or, it may have been the lack of public expertise.

2.5. Deficiencies in Theory and Practice

Sandercock's description of the deficiencies in the theory and practice of public participation is now regarded as one of the most coherent comments on the subject (Fogg, 1981; p.259). Her comments about public participation have set the tone for nearly all subsequent professional attitudes towards participation in planning, particularly in Australia:

...Participation is not a substitute for planning or regular government: it often leads to non-planning and semi-anarchic government. It is not an effective means of radical social change: it often has the opposite effect. And it is not an effective way of involving the 'have-nots' in decisionmaking: all the procedures of participation so far tried are biased towards involving the middle class.

But there are other ends participation may serve.

In some circumstances the process may be more important than the product. People want to be informed. They want to know that they have a ready opportunity to complain. An open planning process, providing easy access to both information and to the planners, can reassure people that they are being thought of. Participatory mechanisms, even those involving no devolution of power, may make public authorities more honest and humane and considerate of the people they are serving than they would otherwise be: more thoughtful of broader issues than their single purpose functions, more sensitive in performing their duties. And participation at the local level may elicit informed and useful responses on questions of local detail, on things that may not seem important to planners (who are therefore unlikely to think of them) but are usually very important in the lives of those suggesting them. So this level of participation may produce a better result for residents, without threatening what planners regard as their expertise, and without bogging down the planning process irretrievably. (Sandercock, 1978; p.7)

Fogg's (1981; p. 259) account of Sandercock's main points are echoed throughout most of the planning literature reviewed: there is no widespread consensus as to the meaning and purpose of participation; the most ambitious theories and models of participation have proved disappointing; the participatory procedures have satisfied neither government nor people; and public participation is possible only by sacrificing other governmental principles such as equality of opportunity (eg. a neighbourhood may decide to use its power to exclude blacks or jews or public housing or homes for the mentally ill or whites [Sandercock, 1978; p. 13]).

Susskind and Elliott (1984; pp. 181-182) discovered some problems action groups have when involving themselves in formal, often legislated and therefore

institutionalised, participation procedures. The procedures were expensive in time and money and groups that decided to participate often found themselves short of the resources they needed to act independently. Participation required compromise and groups would often splinter over the extent to which compromise was appropriate. They often had to moderate their claims or style of attack with the result of reduced media coverage and less ability to apply pressure.

If action groups lost their autonomy, they also lost their ability to threaten resumption of conflict. They also found that their membership had disbanded and that they could not regain their former members. These phenomena were identified in the United States in 1968 by Burke. Little seems to have changed over time or place.

Involvement in formalised procedures appears to have more disadvantages than advantages for an action group. Use of conflict tactics, although adversarial, can be effective in achieving and maintaining grassroots support and media attention. It also prevents officialdom from manipulating or coopting the group. But effective ongoing participation processes are difficult to sustain.

Cochrane (1986; p. 73) described the dilemma of grassroots mobilisation. Mobilisation was difficult to sustain over time. When an issue became widely supported, it tended to be absorbed by the main political parties and specific radical demands were diluted. The other side of the dilemma was that community initiatives were only able to sustain themselves if they committed themselves to the main political parties.

2.6. Conclusion

The theory of public participation over the last thirty years has concentrated on power and democratic structures rather than on outcomes. du Parcq outlined three problems with power structures:

There are three main constraints to effective delegation and devolution of power - the unwillingness of those who have the power to part with any of it, the less enthusiastic response from the neighbourhood / community to the particular brand of democratisation on offer and the inertia of the local government system, particularly in a time of dwindling resources (du Parcq, 1987; p. 26)

The common threads that run through the participation literature over the past 30 years tend to reflect these phenomena:

(i) Institutionalised participation has enabled participants to achieve personal benefits (eg. leadership qualities, self-esteem) but at the expense of public participation becoming a sanctioning element in the decision making process rather than effecting any changes to an outcome.

(ii) The lack of resources to facilitate public participation resulted in exploitation of the participant's abilities, expertise and time.

(iii) Governing bodies have generally been successful in their stance that participants can be controlled or managed by the threat of withdrawal of support if they became militant.

In the late 1980s sectional pressures have demanded more participatory forms of democracy. The idea that a majority decision was more democratic than one allowing those minorities most affected to have a greater say was no longer an accepted assumption. But the history of public participation shows that pressure has to be applied before authorities will make any changes to their attitudes about public participation.

Many of the articles revealed attitudes by planners that were negative, manipulative, and defensive about the role and effectiveness of public participation, even though participation is accepted as part of the ethical and ideological base of the planning profession (Alterman, 1982; p. 311). It seems the focus is on techniques of neutralising or minimalising the effectiveness of any public participation that may be forced upon them. This attitude is presented in relation to the Sullivans Cove case studies in the first hypothesis: the public has had little input in the planning of new development in Sullivans Cove, despite appearances and an apparent willingness by authorities to improve public participation opportunities in response to pressure.

Churchman examined the importance of the process rather than the outcome for the participants. In spite of the planning professions attitudes toward public participation

she found that when there were limits put on the type of decisions open to participation and when professional opinions were made available to the participants, the public participation process would give results that broadly supported the local authority or institution.

Thus, if public participation were an accepted part of most decision making processes, it would appear not to make a significant difference to the final outcome as deference to professional opinions is given by participants and planners alike. Sandercock canvassed an open planning process to reassure the public that its needs were being taken into consideration. From this stance the second hypothesis can be developed: authorities concerned with Sullivans Cove are ill-informed and unnecessarily defensive about real improvements in public participation. People only want to be informed and have a 'ready opportunity to complain'.

The authorities seem to be afraid of losing control of the decision making process, even though it has been shown that the actual outcome of the process is not significantly changed by institutionalised participation and the threat of withdrawal of support is a powerful control mechanism. Possible explanations for the authorities defensiveness could be the threat of powersharing or actual ignorance of public participation processes. It would appear that an institution will still opt for limiting public participation rather than risk losing its overriding decision making power or disclosing its ignorance of procedures.

Almost all the literature written from the authorities' perspective recommends that participation should be controlled and suggests techniques to facilitate this manipulation. The use of conflict tactics, advocacy planning and issue politics is a reaction against the lack of institutionalised support and interest in public participation and opinion. The mere existence of an administrative perspective opposed to the public perspective assumes that sides are taken for or against particular methods of participation.

The third hypothesis is derived from these findings: the reluctance of authorities to allow more effective public participation may be explained by a fear that to go a little

further may increase the community's understanding to the degree that a different kind of participation is actually demanded - beyond simply having a say in a decision here and there to an actual questioning of democratic and powersharing processes involved in development decisionmaking.

Chapter 3: Case Study 1 - The Sheraton International Hotel.


3.1. Introduction

The idea of an international hotel for Hobart emerged as an important and controversial development concept for the city in the early 1980s. The Pacific Enterprise Corporation had been given planning approval by the Hobart City Council to develop an international hotel in Kirksway Place, Battery Point. It was expected that the Hilton Hotel Group would manage it (The Mercury; 11/3/81).

The proposal was opposed in the State Planning Appeals Board by the Battery Point Progress Association, the National Trust and the Marieville Residents Association. The appeal was on the grounds that the decision and development were contrary to the principles, intent and goals of the Battery Point Planning Scheme (The Mercury; 11/3/81). The appellants argued that the hotel would introduce a completely new scale and bulk to Battery Point (The Mercury; 11/3/81); that there was already ample accommodation in Battery Point; and that parking and traffic generation were important unaddressed issues. The addition of another complex would seriously affect the residential integrity of Battery Point. The Marieville Residents Association accused the Hobart City Council of not providing enough information, thereby denying citizens the right to make an informed representation as allowed by the Battery Point Planning Scheme (The Mercury; 12/3/81).

The hotel development was finally thwarted by a technicality, a 'right-of-way' on the land title which dated back to 1847. Its existence was upheld by the Supreme Court. The 'right-of-way' split the site making development of the type planned difficult (The Mercury; 24/12/81).

In December 1982 the Hobart City Council announced that it had re-entered negotiations with an undisclosed company to develop an international standard hotel in Gladstone Street, Battery Point (The Mercury; 21/12/82). But early in 1983, the Tasmanian Liberal Premier, Mr. Robin Gray, decided to take the concept out of the Council's hands, and began preparations for an international hotel on the site of his choosing alongside the docks in Sullivans Cove. (Refer to Map 1, p. 34 which highlights the Premier's chosen site for the Sheraton International Hotel)



Map 1 : The Sheraton International Hotel site, Davey Street, Sullivans Cove.

3.1.1. The Tasmanian Government's Initial Moves.

The State (Liberal) Government claimed it had identified the need for an international hotel in Hobart soon after it came to office. The Premier outlined the perceived benefits to Parliament on March 21, 1985. A new international hotel for Hobart would take advantage of the upgrading of Hobart airport to international standard; be the equivalent of a new industry in the city in creating employment; return employment to the building industry after the reduction of Commonwealth activity; and help maintain Tasmanian standards of living and revitalise the economy.

In June 1983 the State Government advertised both nationally and overseas for expressions of interest. The Premier announced the Government would consider providing financial assistance but offered no details to the public. The Government received 26 responses to the advertisements. The four firms invited by the Government to submit proposals on the international hotel were Civic and Civic, Jennings Industries, White Industries, and GHD Planner West (The Mercury; 14/11/84).

None of the proposals satisfied the height limitations recommended by the 1983 Sullivans Cove Urban Design Study or the 1982 draft Hobart City Planning Scheme. The guidelines provided by the Government in the Brief to the final four contenders emphasised that the hotel must be a landmark and did not refer to these two planning guidelines. The State Government was to have a financial involvement of \$10 million in the development and would lease the site to the developers for a peppercorn rental. This would allow treatment as a Government development to which the 'Crown prerogative' would apply, exempting it from the normal planning requirements of Hobart City Council. The Local Government Act does not apply to Government developments, but the State and Commonwealth Governments usually take into account the view of Councils and the public.

The Premier appointed an internal subcommittee to advise the best proposal. No design advisor was on this subcommittee which recommended the Jennings Industries proposal (The Examiner; 22/11/84). The State Government subsequently chose the GHD Planner West proposal.

In November 1984 the GHD Planner West plans were made available and public debate raged over the design which consisted of twin 18 story towers of reflective glass. Legislation ratifying the Government's stake of \$10 million in the hotel was expected to be introduced and passed before Christmas, allowing a construction start in March 1985. Criticism of the hotel included its design, its scale, contrasting sharply with the average height of 3-4 floors of Sullivans Cove's 19th century buildings, and the lack of consultation with the community and interested groups (The Examiner; 22/11/84). The Tasmanian chapters of the Royal Australian Institute of Architects (RAIA) and the Royal Australian Planning Institute (RAPI) rejected the design, whilst Hobart's Lord Mayor supported the expected State Government move to legislate for the development (The Mercury; 13/11/84).

3.1.2. The Public Response.

The Sullivans Cove Citizens Committee (SCCC) was formed as a result of the spontaneous public debate which erupted. The Tasmanian chapters of the RAIA and RAPI initiated its formation when they called a public meeting regarding the proposed hotel on November 21, 1984. A crowd of 600 called on the Government to reject the GHD Planner West design. A further public meeting was held on November 28, 1984 when a steering committee (called the Sullivans Cove Citizens Committee) was appointed.

The Sullivans Cove Citizens Committee found there appeared to be widespread support for the concept of an international hotel, that there appeared to be no significant questioning of the appropriateness of the Davey Street / Victoria Dock site, and no objections to the removal of the existing buildings (Draft Submission to the Premier; November, 1984; p. 2).

It asked whether the Government had prepared studies to establish that a new hotel was justified; what its effects would be on the existing hospitality industry and about its viability and the Government's proposal to invest State funds in the project. It criticised the Government for disregarding normal procedures for the approval of building projects and its apparent disregard of restrictions recommended by both the

1982 draft City of Hobart Planning Scheme and the 1983 Sullivans Cove Urban Design Study (SCCC Position Statement; p.1).

It protested against (i) the excessive height of the proposed hotel, which was more than twice the maximum suggested in the Sullivans Cove Study and would make the hotel higher than any other city building; (ii) the siting of the planned towers close to the dock which was the reverse of recommendations made by the Sullivans Cove Study; (iii) the reflective external walls which were seen to be tawdry, 'gimmicky' and alien to the Cove; and (iv) the overwhelming bulk of the towers which would decrease the public's enjoyment and appreciation of the historic dock area as a recreation space and tourist attraction. It was argued that there were other ways of creating visual impact besides sheer height; that local expertise should be used as well as local building materials; and that the proposed remission of rates, payable to the Hobart City Council, discriminated against Hobart ratepayers (SCCC Position Statement; pp. 2-3). The Sullivans Cove Citizens Committee decided, because of the divergent opinions within the group, and as it was not in a position to comment on the effects of the proposed hotel on existing establishments, that the economics of the new hotel could not be addressed within its own structure.

Although the Premier and the architects decided to redesign the proposed hotel and the Sullivans Cove Development Authority was given a role in negotiating the new design, the Sullivans Cove Citizens Committee remained concerned about:

i) the effectiveness of the proposed redesign, as the architect's representative, Mr. Bearn, had made it very clear that he saw the height and tower blocks as essential to the effective use of the site and to the commercial viability of the hotel; and

ii) the ability of the Sullivans Cove Development Authority to act as an effective channel for consultation, as it had not been set up for that purpose and, with the exception of its chairman, Mr. Claudio Alcorso, was made up of official representatives - of the Government, the City Council, the Marine Board, the Chamber of Commerce, and the Institutes of Architects and Planning (SCCC Bulletin 1; 13/12/84). The Committee felt the Authority should have citizen representation, with the Sullivans Cove Citizens Committee providing such representation (SCCC Position Statement; p. 3).

The Premier's response was to inform the Committee that the Hobart City Council would be responsible for examining and recommending the new hotel design and that the State Government would not receive opinions except those provided by the Hobart City Council. He added that a) an international hotel was going ahead on the Sullivans Cove site, the only question was design; b) another high-rise was not likely to be submitted; c) a satisfactory design would be accepted during March; and d) studies had been done by the developers to ensure that they could make money out of the hotel, and the issue of the effect on other Hobart accommodation and hotel trade was one best left to the market to sort out (SCCC Bulletin 2; February, 1985 and SCCC Submission to the Hobart City Council; 11/4/85).

The Site Development Brief for the redesign of the proposed hotel, prepared for the Hobart City Council was made available to the Sullivans Cove Citizens Committee at the end of January, 1985. The Brief had been endorsed by the Council without broad public comment or input, although the Sullivans Cove Citizens Committee had been consulted during its preparation. The latter found the guidelines inadequate and requested the requirement of a full public statement from the architects explaining the features of the intended design and their relation to the guidelines. It also insisted that Council follow procedures which would allow for public information and response once the new plans were available (Letter to Town Clerk; 9/2/85).

The Sullivans Cove Citizens Committee responded to the Hobart City Council's public notice in The Mercury, 30/3/85, Hobart's daily newspaper, inviting public submissions on the redesign of the proposed international hotel, with a seven page critique. It listed the matters of concern which included: i) the design not conforming to the City of Hobart Planning Scheme; ii) the guidelines being inappropriate; iii) the availability of possible alternatives; iv) the use of the site; v) the scale of the development - especially its bulk and height; vi) its effects on vistas and views; vii) the building materials and their colour; and viii) doubts that the hotel was of a 5-star standard. It emphasised that because the second design was preferred to the first, it did not make it suitable; and that threats by Government and developers about discouraging development should be irrelevant to sound planning decisions.

The Sullivans Cove Citizens Committee challenged the Premier's enthusiasm about employment creation potential, commenting on the warning made by the executive director of the Master Builder's Association (The Mercury, 16/3/85) that there was a likely lack of available labour if several imminent large projects were to go ahead. The Director of Planning and Development had also commented that Hobart's labour and building materials resources would be stretched for the next few years (The Mercury; 16/3/85).

In April 1985, the Sullivans Cove Citizens Committee released the results of a survey they had conducted with Hobart residents. The results were as follows:

Total response	1050 people
Not in favour of latest proposal	75%
In favour of latest proposal	25%
No more tourist accommodation is needed	25%
Will damage existing local business	23%
Taxpayers' money should be used	11%

(Letter to the Town Clerk; 24/4/85)

The Sullivans Cove Citizens Committee analysis of these results claimed that: i) the main reason for rejection of the proposal was the design's lack of suitability for the site; ii) there was still widespread interest in the hotel issue; and iii) people were not opposed to the development of the site or of the provision of more tourist facilities. It called on the Council to resist the unnecessary pressure for haste which the State Government would apply (Letter to the Town Clerk; 24/4/85).

The Sullivans Cove Citizens Committee was an insistent and eloquent voice in the debate over the design of the proposed international hotel. Its representations to the Premier and the Hobart City Council were articulate and informed and there can be

no doubt that its involvement facilitated the redesign of the hotel. It was a very forthright and effective lobbying organisation even though its extensive list of questions and concerns were rarely formally or publicly answered by either the State Government or the Hobart City Council.

Nevertheless, it can be criticised in its role as public watchdog and informer. In March 1985 it was a participant in a secret meeting to discuss the new plans for the international hotel. The State Government had insisted on complete confidentiality by all involved in these discussions. The Sullivans Cove Development Authority, the National Trust, local architects, as well as the Sullivans Cove Citizens Committee agreed to the conditions (The Mercury; 14/3/85). It might be argued that the opportunity for participation and consultation justified following the secrecy rules. The role of the SCCC as a public pressure group may have been compromised by complicity, despite the announcement afterwards that it opposed the new design.

3.1.3. The Hobart City Council.

The Hobart City Council had been aware of the controversy surrounding the proposed hotel. It was aware that it needed to clarify its own position while the State Government was treating the international hotel as a Government development with 'Crown prerogative'. After the second public meeting on November 28, 1984 (when the Sullivans Cove Citizens Committee was formed, a redesign of the proposed hotel mooted, and the Council was subsequently given the responsibility for examining the proposal) the Lord Mayor, Alderman Brian Broadby, wrote to the Premier outlining the Council's conditions for accepting the responsibility of the public participation. The Lord Mayor advised the Government

that although it was considered within the Council's right to deal with the development outside the normal planning provisions as a government development, nevertheless, it wished to be protected in legislation against claims that it should have considered the matter under the normal planning processes which are subject to appeal (Letter from the Lord Mayor to the Premier, November 30, 1984).

On December 12, 1984 the State Government accepted Council's conditions confirming that both the State Government and the Lord Mayor wanted legislation to fast-track the development. The Premier gave the responsibility for examining and recommending a new hotel design to the Hobart City Council because it had the mechanisms for providing public input.

3.1.4. The Site Development Brief for the International Hotel.

The Site Development Brief for the International Hotel required by the Hobart City Council was prepared by Lester Firth and Associates for \$10,000. It was received in mid-January 1985. The full Council adopted the final guidelines. Although they had been prepared after consultation with various interest groups and professional bodies, including the Sullivans Cove Citizens Committee, they had not been released to the public for comment. The resultant Brief deviated little from the Sullivans Cove Urban Design Study which Lester Firth and Associates had prepared for the Sullivans Cove Development Authority in 1983.

3.1.5. The 1983 Sullivans Cove Urban Design Study.

The 1983 Sullivans Cove Urban Design Study mentioned that the State Government was working toward the development of an international hotel on this site (SCUDS, 1983; p. 148) and confined itself to commenting on design concepts rather than alternative development suggestions. It suggested:

....(A)ppropriate uses would include partial, or full, site development for tourist/hotel/convention facilities, related cultural uses and/or office accommodation together with on site parking provision.
(SCUDS, 1983; p. 126)

A major arrival space should be located at the head of Hunter Street and the development form related to the historic docks area. A two or three podium base related to the height of Customs House with a six to eight storey tower, setback from the podium edge, could readily be accepted within the urban design framework. (SCUDS, 1983; p.128)

3.1.6. The 1982 City of Hobart Planning Scheme.

The 1982 draft City of Hobart Planning Scheme was also discussed in the 1985 Site Development Brief. The Brief noted that the Planning Scheme supported land use directed towards tourism and related activities in the Frame Precinct 13 (where the international hotel was to be located) but stressed the maintenance of the 2-3 storey historic 'wall' around the Cove and the geometric building forms. It recommended a maximum height of four storeys for buildings built to the street frontage.

Confusingly, the Planning Scheme also suggested that the maximum height of new buildings should not be greater than the prevailing height of buildings in the vicinity unless it could be satisfactorily demonstrated that the proposed development would not have a detrimental effect on the existing townscape amenity and environment. It also suggested that within the frame district, new buildings would not be permitted to exceed 12 metres in height unless the Council was satisfied that there were unusual topographic or other circumstances. The Planning Scheme provided for the international hotel site to have a plot ratio of between 0.5 and 2.0. It also permitted bonus plot ratios to be awarded in respect of developments which provided specific uses, facilities and features required for the benefit of the city (Lester Firth, 1985; p. 4 and HCC Planning Scheme, 1982).

The Site Development Brief justified its suggested design guidelines by relating it to the Planning Scheme:

- i) A two or three storey podium base would relate to the height of the nearby 3-storey Customs House and the upper built form of around 6 to 8 storeys which would relate to the gasworks tower. It thus seemingly satisfied the requirements of maintaining the historic wall around the Cove and not being greater than the prevailing height of buildings in the vicinity. (Refer to Plate 2 for an illustration of the effect of Sheraton International Hotel's Podium base and the Customs House.)
- ii) The stepped building form was a design measure to reduce the building's height and bulk.




Plate 2 : The Sheraton International Hotel (right) and the Customs House (left). The podium of the Hotel was to relate to the height of the Customs House.

iii) The setback of the podium from the street frontage reflected the setback of the Town Hall, Museum and the Ordinance building (Lester Firth, 1985; pp. 8-10).

The Brief suggested that any subsequent extensions to the museum should reflect the setback of the proposed international hotel to achieve visual continuity.

3.1.7. The Redesign of the Proposed International Hotel.

The redesign of the proposed international hotel occurred during January and February 1985 after the adoption of the Site Development Brief. During January and February 1985 the architects revisited Hobart several times to consult with various interest groups. They had extensive discussions with Mr. Alf Lester to ensure any new design met his guidelines. By mid-February 1985 the new design had reached a preliminary stage and the architects met with the Sullivans Cove Development Authority, the Hobart City Council, the National Trust, town planners, professional architects and other interested Hobart groups such as the Sullivans Cove Citizens Committee to get agreement before the formal submission of the plans to the Council. The suggested amendments took several weeks to complete.

Council advertised the revised plans on March 30, 1985 to seek objections (which were to be treated as opinions only) and the plans and details were made available for public inspection at the Town Hall for two weeks from April 2 - 15, 1985. The opinions of the public and those of Council were then to be passed on to the Government for consideration. It appeared the State Government wanted to prevent a repeat of the public outcry sparked by the apparent fait accompli of the initial design of the hotel. The hotel was becoming an election liability rather than an asset (The Mercury; 28/2/85).

At the subsequent Hobart City Council meeting of April 22, 1985 the Council decided the revised plans conformed with the Site Development Brief and the Council offered no objection to the proposal subject to some conditions (Minutes of Council Meeting; 22/4/85). The State (Liberal) Government had already introduced the fast-track legislation by this time.

3.1.8. The Financial Package Provided by the State Government.

The financial package provided by the State Government to the developers was also being redesigned. It was now limited to interest bearing loans that Premier Gray said were very similar to normal development loans. The Government had originally planned to provide \$10m of the \$50m capital cost of the hotel development, giving it a 20% interest (The Advocate, 22/3/85). The final financial package was as follows:

- (i) \$6.75m at 8% interest repayable at the end of 10 years when construction was completed.
- (ii) Project participants agreed to purchase the land from the Government for \$3.1m. \$3m would then be loaned back to the project participants at 8% interest repayable at the end of 10 years.
- (iii) The Government would also waive stamp duty charges on the purchase of the land.

Premier Gray emphasised that the project must commence before June 30, 1985 or it would lose the Federal Government's 18% investment allowance. He felt there had been sufficient public input into the revised hotel design and that the project should be given the go-ahead as soon as possible (The Advocate; 22/3/85).

3.1.9. The International Hotel Development Bill 1985

The International Hotel Development Bill 1985 was read for the second time on April 10, 1985. The Premier explained that the Government, the Hobart City Council, various interest groups and the public had engaged in a most exhaustive consultation process about the development and due to time constraints the Government did not view the normal planning and building approval processes as appropriate. The Bill was necessary to protect the Hobart City Council and to ensure construction proceeded without delay. The emphasis justifying the fast-track legislation had changed from the hotel being a Government development with public equity to the argument that the public had had adequate input and the development needed facilitating to ensure an early start.

3.1.10. The Developer's Response

The developer's response to the delays in approving the international hotel was:

The dilemma that exists is that the State Government must maximise the development of its narrow economic base and yet Tasmanians in general, and Hobartians in particular, are represented as wishing to unconditionally maintain the status quo.....(Tasmania) depends on interstate business and (yet) it is suggested we design ... exclusively for Hobartians.

The approved design lacked the 'landmark' quality of the original 18-storey proposal but was an acceptable compromise between the operational needs of an international hotel and the sometimes conflicting but always provincial expressions of concern. (The Mercury; 15/11/85)

Mr. Rippon, a GHD Planner West representative, called on the Government to ensure that general development and design rules were specified in advance and not midstream of the development.

3.2. Summary of the Sheraton International Hotel Case Study

The State (Liberal) Government decided it would promote and encourage the building of an international hotel after the failure of two such attempts by the Hobart City Council. After advertising for interested developers, the Government eventually shortlisted four designs which met its requirement for a 'landmark' development. The successful design chosen by the Government was the most dramatic and expensive.

When this design was presented to the public there was enormous uproar and a public protest campaign mounted. The Sullivans Cove Citizens Committee was formed as a result of a public meeting attended by 600 people. The design of the Hotel was regarded as unsympathetic to the historic precinct and docklands area in which it was to be located. The public appeared to have no argument with the concept of an international hotel or the site chosen. The design chosen by the Government and the lack of public participation were the major problems.

The Premier agreed to the redesign of the hotel after the public protest meeting and handed the responsibility for examining and recommending a new design to the Hobart City Council. The Hobart City Council prepared guidelines for the new design and the Sullivans Cove Citizens Committee was consulted. The Sullivans Cove Citizens Committee found the guidelines to be inadequate. Nevertheless, these guidelines were given to the GHD Planner West architects.

The redesigned International Hotel was offered for public comment in March 1985 by the Hobart City Council. The Sullivans Cove Citizens Committee, among others, submitted a lengthy response. At the subsequent April 22 Council meeting the Council accepted the redesign.

The Council accepted the redesign knowing that the development had already been fast-tracked by the State Government. The Government had introduced fast-track legislation earlier in April using the argument that there had been exhaustive public comment, therefore normal planning and building approval processes were unnecessary.

The developers had been told by the State Government to provide a landmark building and this is what they did in the first instance. They also redesigned it on request and followed the Hobart City Council's development guidelines closely. The Government had not initially considered allowing public comment on the design of the Hotel. It had been correct in its assumption that the concept of an international hotel would be accepted by the public and that the Davey Street / Victoria Docks site would be regarded as appropriate. It was a logical progression for the Government to believe that the design it chose would also be accepted by the public. An international hotel is of necessity a large building. If a large building was necessary then it might as well be a 'landmark'.

The Government's miscalculation of the public's reaction was in not recognising Sullivans Cove heritage values and the importance the community placed on those values. A modern 'landmark' building of 18 storeys set back from the street was to be put in a historic area where the buildings were predominately 3-4 storeys high,

forming a 'wall' around the Cove. The design of the Hotel was totally unsympathetic to Sullivans Cove. (Refer to Plate 3 which illustrates an example of the 'wall' around the cove)

The people of Hobart wanted the right to have a say on the development. The Government should have realised that there would be public controversy over the hotel and allowed for its participation. The Hobart City Council had tried twice to encourage the development of such a Hotel and failed both times, once having had to deal with a public legal challenge.

3.3. Analysis of Participation.

There was little appearance of public participation in the International Hotel development even though considerable public pressure was applied to achieve the participation eventually permitted. The conceded participation consisted of the Sullivans Cove Citizens Committee being consulted during the preparation of the Site Development Brief and being present at a confidential meeting to discuss the new plans, and the public having two weeks to comment on the redesigned development.

Consultation did not mean having input. The Site Development Brief was adopted by Hobart City Council without the approval of the bodies it had consulted. The public was invited to comment on the government sanctioned redesign but fast-track legislation was introduced before this process was complete. Although the legislation did not detail the design specifications the State Government's attitude did not give the public any confidence that its opinion was to be considered.

Public participation had not been intended to be a factor in the decisionmaking for the development of the Sheraton International Hotel. The participation eventually allowed gave no opportunity for a complete rethink about the development's relevance to the historic precinct in which it was located. The public had no opportunity to say what it actually wanted or how it wanted the precinct developed.

The State Government's justification for fast-tracking the development was that there had been exhaustive public comment. The Government was confusing media



Plate 3 : The Hunter Street 'Wall' of buildings. The Sheraton International is located at the northern end of Hunter Street (North \nwarrow)

attention and criticism with formal input of which there was none heeded. Formal public participation did not change the design of the development. Media pressure and the size of the public protest meeting were the impetus for the Government to compromise the design.

The State Government could not take advantage of public participation as a planning tool in the original design. When the people of Hobart insisted on the right to comment it became obvious that the the State Government could not comply as it did not have the required public participation mechanisms. It had to ask the Hobart City Council to provide the appropriate mechanisms.

Following the public meeting called to protest the design, the State Government agreed to redesign the proposal and allow public participation through the Hobart City Council but it was at Arnstein's consultation level. The public was invited to 'participate in participation' (Arnstein, 1969; p. 219). The participation also conformed to Burke's lowest level of review and comment (Burke, 1979; p. 74). The public was given an opportunity to review the redesigned plans but no commitment was given to alter or modify those plans.

The participation did not qualify for Glass' lowest objective of participation, information exchange. This administrative objective was aimed at bringing planners and the public together to share ideas and concerns (Glass, 1979; p. 182). The participation was a public relations exercise similar to that described by Hambleton as consumerism. The intent was to 'get closer to the customer' in a publicly visible manner but with no actual transfer of decisionmaking power (Hambleton, 1988; p. 125).

The Sullivans Cove Citizens Committee became a minor elite organisation supported by public mandate. This mandate and its strong professional membership, placed it in a strong position to assert influence over future development projects such as the Hobart Civic Square. Its successful mobilisation encouraged it to demand a greater say in the decisionmaking processes in Sullivans Cove. After the Sheraton International Hotel debate had run its course it changed its structure from a

Committee to an Association to allow it to become involved with more than one issue in the Cove. The public, through the Sullivans Cove Citizens Committee, had had a taste of what could be achieved when it mobilised against the Sheraton International Hotel. The next major issue, the Hobart Civic Square, would be approached by the public and its action group in a more confident manner.

Chapter 4: Case Study 2 - The Civic Square.

4.1. Introduction.


A Hobart civic square was first proposed in 1811 (Civic Forum, Mr. Barry McNeill; 17/8/89). The present site was highlighted in the ambitious but largely ignored and unsealed 1945 City of Hobart Plan which suggested that Constitution and Victoria Docks be filled in and used as building sites (Cook, 1945; p.46).

The idea of a Civic Square for Hobart on the present proposed site bounded by Davey, Elizabeth, Morrison and Argyle Streets evolved during the 1950s. The Hobart City Council began its purchase of private property within the site during this time. It was to be a civic space for large formal events and community gatherings. The square was seen as a way of opening the city to the water. (Refer to Map 2 which shows the location of the Hobart Civic Square Site)

In 1974 the Hobart City Council held a public design competition on the proposed civic square. No structured guidelines were developed for the competition. Most of the ideas put forward by the public had strong ties to yachting and the early history of Hobart's waterfront. Suggestions included a meeting place, a music bowl, a quiet resting place, a place for tourist developments, and botanical displays (The Mercury; 21/7/88). The continuing rapid structural change in the Sullivans Cove area during the 1970s encouraged the main landowners, the Hobart City Council, the State Government and the Hobart Marine Board to sponsor the development of planning studies.

4.2. Planning Studies on Sullivans Cove and the Civic Square.

The following section discusses the resultant studies and their relationship to the concept of a civic square for Hobart. They included the 1979 Sullivans Cove Study, the 1983 Sullivans Cove Urban Design Study, the 1984 edition of the 1982 draft City of Hobart Planning Scheme and the 1987 Sullivans Cove Urban Detail and Bicentennial Walking Trail Study. Two other studies were also relevant to the Sullivans Cove area and will be discussed below in their Sullivans Cove context. They are the 1978 Derwent Region Transportation Study and the 1985 Hobart



Map 2 : The Hobart Civic Square Site


Central Area Traffic and Parking Study. The Battery Point Planning Scheme is also concerned with part of the Sullivans Cove precinct although it does not directly affect the civic square or Sheraton International hotel sites.

4.2.1. The 1978 Derwent Region Transportation Study.

The 1978 Derwent Region Transportation Study (DRTS) was published by the Department of Main Roads. Its findings were to have a major impact on the Sullivans Cove area. It claimed to concentrate on local problems rather than emphasising regional strategies because the network of primary arterial outlet roads was nearly completed and there was perceived low growth and limited development opportunities in the broader Derwent region. The study outlined a proposed development scheme for Sullivans Cove with the primary purpose of enhancing redevelopment opportunities by dividing the area into sensible development blocks. The Davey Street extension was part of this development scheme. Traffic flow and circulation was incidental (DRTS, 1978; 2). (Refer to Map 3 which shows the location of Davey Street)

The 1979 Sullivans Cove Study was not consistent with the land use and development implications of the 1978 Derwent Region Transportation Study. It recommended against the proposed Davey Street extension. It suggested a comprehensive pedestrian network connecting Battery Point, Sullivans Cove and the city (SCS, 1979; pp. vi - vii). The pedestrian network was eventually adopted as the Bicentennial Walking Trail developed in the Sullivans Cove Urban Detail and Bicentennial Walking Trail Study in 1988 (discussed below).

In direct contrast the 1983 Sullivans Cove Urban Design Study accepted the road and traffic proposals outlined in the 1978 Derwent Region Transportation Study and tailored its planning and design concepts to the expected ramifications of the Davey Street extension. It also suggested traffic management measures for the civic square site. The 1985 Hobart Central Area Traffic and Parking Study endorsed the additional traffic management measures developed in the 1983 Study.



Map 3 : The Davey Street extension. It was to enhance redevelopment opportunities rather than solve traffic problems

4.2.2. The 1979 Sullivans Cove Study.

The 1979 Sullivans Cove Study, prepared for the Hobart City Council, was the first to suggest a commercial component for the civic square. It suggested the provision of cultural activities for the people of Hobart which could be supported by some small scale office and commercial development. It did not provide clear urban design details for the civic square (Personal communication, Mr. Peter Curtis, 16/10/89).

A Council officer's report on the 1979 Study commented on the inclusion of a number of potential uses for the civic square site:

In contrast to its original purpose as a 'permanent window towards the harbour' i.e. parklands, the report recommends that the site is well situated to provide some or all the recreational facilities to city workers and visitors. A restaurant or tavern facility, a community information centre associated with major public events and some offices and street level commercial facilities to name a few.

This change in thinking from a single function facility to the multi-functional development suggested by the Sullivans Cove report reflects the evolution and recognition of the Sullivans Cove precinct as a unique opportunity to develop a framework within which land use in the study area can be co-ordinated and effectively controlled.

A development incorporating such a range of activities and oriented towards the promotion of the Sullivans Cove area could be developed by a joint public/commercial venture and with approximately \$600,000 already invested in the project, some monetary gains would be preferable. To minimise further expenditure and to keep the guidelines of the report concerning historically important buildings, the Piesse and Co. building and if possible the Chesterman building should be retained.

(Refer to Plate 4, p. 57 illustrating the Chesterman Buildings and the Piesse and Co. building)

4.2.3. The 1983 Sullivans Cove Urban Design Study.

The 1983 Sullivans Cove Urban Design Study (SCUDS) was prepared by Mr. Alf Lester from Lester Firth and Associates, a Canberra based architectural firm, for the Sullivans Cove Development Authority. The 1983 Study confined its comments on



Plate 4 : The Chesterman buildings (in the foreground) and the Piesse and Co. building (cream brick to the rear of the Chesterman buildings). Both are classified by the National Trust (Tasmania).

the civic square site to suggested design concepts and did not support the retention of the buildings on the site (SCUDS, 1983; p. 127).

4.2.4. The City of Hobart's Planning Scheme.

The Hobart City Council's (HCC) 1982 draft Planning Scheme's statement on the desired future character of the Sullivans Cove Precinct as a Conservation Zone was particularly relevant to the development of the Civic Square site, especially with regard to the subsequent changes to the Planning Scheme's Codes:

Development in the Sullivan's Cove Precinct should respect and reinforce its primary conservation status as the first place of permanent settlement in Hobart, its role in the early development of the City, and its intimate relationship with the waterfront.....

The entire waterfrontage of the Precinct must be conserved for its historic and architectural importance in the townscape of the City. Any new buildings should maintain or complete the existing two or three storey wall around the Cove and complement its primary geometric forms.

Elsewhere in the Precinct new buildings should have a maximum height of four storeys, be built to the street frontage and be sympathetic to historic built form. New development should not detract from any existing vistas or views within the area. Materials and colour schemes should reflect the predominately lighter colour and mellow tones of older buildings. (HCC, 1984; pp. 24-25)

On November 25, 1985 the Conservation Zone of Sullivans Cove in the 1982 Draft City of Hobart Planning Scheme was modified by the Council by special resolution. The civic square site was now the only site in the Sullivans Cove Precinct not to be included in a Conservation Zone (Hobart City Council Codes; Conservation Zone No. 1). This excision would allow for the demolition of the Chesterman buildings and the Piesse and Co. building, if necessary, during any redevelopment of the site, and would also allow planning flexibility regarding the height of any buildings (Personal communication, Mr. Peter Curtis, 16/10/89).

In late 1989 the Hobart City Council was in the process of resubmitting the draft City of Hobart Planning Scheme to the Commissioner for Town and Country Planning for

sealing. The sections dealing with Sullivans Cove and the Central City area, in particular, were being modified (Personal communication, Mr. Peter Curtis, 16/10/89 and Mr. Barry McNeill, 18/10/89).

4.2.5. The 1985 Hobart Central Area Traffic and Parking Study.

The 1985 Hobart Central Area Traffic and Parking Study (HoCAS) prepared for the Hobart City Council and the Department of Main Roads accepted and adopted the traffic studies by Mr. Alf Lester for Sullivans Cove in the 1983 Sullivans Cove Urban Design Study, but commented:

It is predicted that by 1995 the ability of the central road network, modified by the Davey Street extension project, in coping with forecast peak hour traffic demands will be marginal to unsatisfactory (HoCAS, 1985; p. iv).

4.2.6. The 1987 Sullivans Cove Urban Detail and Bicentennial Walking Trail Study.

The 1987 Sullivans Cove Urban Detail and Bicentennial Walking Trail Study was prepared by Hobart Consultants Leigh Woolley, John Hepper and Jerry deGryse for the Sullivans Cove Development Authority. Like the 1983 Sullivans Cove Urban Design Study, it confined its comments on the civic square to supporting the accepted multi-functional use of the site (the design concepts echoed those of the 1974 public competition).

4.3. A Preliminary Look at the Public's Role

The concept of a multi-functional civic square development was provided with a relatively consistent set of guidelines for potential developers by the 1979 Sullivans Cove Study, the 1983 Sullivans Cove Urban Design Study, the 1987 Sullivans Cove Urban Detail and Bicentennial Walking Trail Study as well as relevant sections in the 1982 Draft Hobart City Planning Scheme, the Davey Street extension outlined in the 1978 Derwent Region Transportation Study and the subsequent additions in the 1985 Hobart Central Area Traffic and Parking Study. Most of the reports were pragmatic in that they reflected the development requirements of the public bodies involved with

the Cove (especially the Hobart City Council) during the time of the late 1970s and early 1980s (Personal communication, Mr. Peter Curtis, 16/10/89).

The planning studies discussed above were released and distributed to professional bodies which were invited to comment. The public was also able to comment but its response was negligible. This was a typical reaction to the release of planning documents before the development of the Sheraton Hotel. The public would soon show its awareness of Sullivans Cove and the Civic Square issue and its preparedness to become more involved in deciding future developments.

The growing awareness of development proposals for Sullivans Cove was reflected in the public's reaction to the proposed civic square in the late 1980s. The change in concept from an open, green space to a developer-lead commercial scheme providing free public amenities to the Hobart City Council was to prove unacceptable to the people of Hobart. Once again, and in a surprisingly short time after the Sheraton International Hotel row, the public voice was heard. This time the outcome would be different. The development proposal would be modified and then withdrawn by the developers who would then announce their intention to involve the public much earlier in discussions for any new scheme.

At present the debate in the planning and political sectors of the community suggests that a new study needs to be commissioned to review and combine the previous Studies into one workable planning document. Others argue that each document fulfills a different purpose and needs to be an individual entity. Yet others argue that Sullivans Cove should not have a planning scheme separate from the rest of the city, and that any planning scheme for Sullivans Cove (and Battery Point) should be incorporated into the Hobart City Council Planning Scheme to ensure consistent and systematic planning.

This debate is anticipated to become more fervent because the Sullivans Cove Development Authority was circulating a draft brief for a Sullivans Cove Urban Design and Planning Review. This Review will look at the existing documents, especially the 1983 Sullivans Cove Urban Design Study which is recognised by the Sullivans Cove Development Authority as having severe limitations with 'too few

guiding principles, too many site-specific preconceptions and some guidelines that may have been inappropriate' (Review Brief, 1989; p.3).

4.4. The Civic Square in the Late 1980s.

The following discussion focuses on the development of the civic square in the late 1980s. It outlines the series of events leading to the developers withdrawing their (revised) plans, in order to provide data for analysing the decisionmaking process.

4.4.1. Introduction.

In November 1986 the Hobart City Council announced that it had decided to establish a multi-million dollar waterfront civic square development one block away from the Sheraton International Hotel. The Council planned to offer a suitable business group a substantial part of the land free in exchange for the provision of a civic square (The Mercury; 27/11/86).

The Tasmanian chapter of the Royal Australian Institute of Architects (RAIA) had initially suggested to the Council that a design competition be held before calling for commercial interest but this was rejected by the Council as too costly, time consuming and likely to produce financial and administrative complications. The competition would be for commercial developers only (The Mercury; 6/7/88). Prize money of \$60,000 was to be offered for the winning entry (Personal communication, Mr. Peter Curtis, 16/10/89).

During November 1986 the Hobart City Council announced it was negotiating with the Hobart Marine Board for extra land on the civic square site, which was bounded by Davey, Elizabeth, Morrison and Argyle Streets, with no waterfrontage (The Mercury; 28/11/86). In July 1987 a land exchange was confirmed. The Hobart Marine Board would take control of, and have the right to obtain income from, the section of Hunter Street between the Centre for the Arts and Davey Street which had been previously controlled by the Council. A pedestrian area would be jointly developed in Hunter Street by the State Government which would contribute \$150,000, and the Hobart City Council, which would contribute \$100,000. In exchange the Hobart City

Council's proposed civic square could be next to Constitution Dock and cover parts of Argyle and Morrison Streets (The Mercury; 8/7/87).

The swap was a fairly controversial decision as the section of Hunter Street, known as Old Wharf, passing into the Hobart Marine Board ownership was to have been a pedestrian mall (SCUDS; p.127) or a multi-purpose concourse (SCUDS; p.132) consisting of widened footpaths and carparking (The Mercury; 10/7/87).

During October 1987 the Hobart City Council held official launches for the Civic Square competition in Melbourne, Sydney and Brisbane as well as Hobart, inviting potential interstate and Tasmanian developers to show expressions of interest in the development (The Mercury; 19/10/87, Personal communication, Mr. Peter Curtis, 16/10/89). The interstate launch included a marketing package which cost the Council \$50,000. It consisted of a 10 minute video, an extensive guideline manual, and a colourful prospectus showing the features of the site (The Southern Star; 4/11/87).

The financial package developed by the Council consisted of a lease on the 7,500 m2, \$3.5 million site to the developer free of charge in exchange for public facilities. The development was to be half commercial, and half a significant and prestigious public facility. A selection of four submissions would be made and the final decision would be given by May 1988 (The Mercury; 28/10/87).

The State Labor Opposition member, Mr. John White, and Independent member, Dr. Bob Brown, argued that the square should be parkland on the water's edge and that the historic buildings should be preserved (Media release, 28/10/87; The Mercury; 29/10/87). Seven buildings were to be directly affected by the proposed development of the site, two of which were classified by the National Trust (The Mercury; 30/10/87).

By the December 21, 1987 deadline for submissions, 12 proposals had been received by Council. Four were shortlisted during January. Alderman Barry Fisher sought to head off criticism by assuring Hobart people that:

We're trying hard not to get the same problems that the Sheraton had.
We want to give people what they want (The Southern Star; 6/1/88).

In February 1988 the HCC announced their chosen proposals. They were:

1. Bond Corp - architects Mitchell, Giurgola and Thorp who designed Australia's new Parliament House in Canberra.

Bond Corp's \$30 million 'Central Public Plaza Concept' consisted of a series of buildings surrounding a central plaza. It had a seven-storey building as tall as the Marine Board building nearby and two low dockside buildings which were three storeys high from dock level and two storeys high from plaza level. These two buildings provided a coffee shop, restaurant and small retail spaces with the plaza level of the dock east building being designed as an exhibition/conference space. The third level was offices. The existing buildings along Davey Street would be replaced with a three storey structure for commercial and retail offices or a museum/visitor centre. The form and character of the buildings were intended to respond to the historical warehouse architecture which was unique to Hobart.

2. Jennings Industries Ltd - architects Bates, Smart, McHutcheon in association with the Hobart firm Jacob, Allom and Wade.

Jennings Industries 'Dockside Plaza' consisted of two new buildings - one of eight levels with areas for retail, office and specialist tourist facilities, and the other a replacement for existing dockside offices with a smaller building comprising restaurants and bars. It did not include an on-site carpark but proposed a decked car park with 255 spaces away from the waterfront. It would include a 100 seat theatrette, a possible maritime museum, restaurants, bars, retail and entertainment area and a major tourist destination centre.

3. Lawrence Neld and Partners - this was an architectural firm which intended to use Leighton Contractors as their builders. They did not put forward a final proposal.

4. John Holland Properties- architects Lester Firth and Associates, the company which produced the Sullivans Cove Urban Design Study in 1983.

The John Holland \$25 million proposal was 4 storey building around a public plaza fronting onto Constitution Dock. It included prestige offices, underground parking, a restaurant/tavern and an arcade leading from the plaza to Franklin Square. The plans recommended archaeological research and full documentation of findings. The names of the early buildings on the site would be used in the new development (The Mercury; 21/6/88).

The four companies, chosen by four officers from the Council (including the Town Clerk, the Assistant Director, Architecture and Alderman Barry Fisher), were given a deadline of June 14, 1988 to submit their detailed submissions. The final fully documented proposals, which included scale models, were to be considered by three relevant city council committees, a special advisory body, and the public before going to a meeting of the full Council for a final decision. The Council also reserved its right to refuse all the proposals (The Mercury; 11/5/88).

The members of the independent advisory committee were announced: Mr. Greg Deas, chief architect of the National Capital Development Corporation (NCDC); Mr. Geoff Parr, Director of the School of Art, University of Tasmania; Dr. Bruce Felmingham, from the Economics Department, University of Tasmania; Mr. Eric Hayes, Hobart Chamber of Commerce; Mrs Kristine Ancher, Sullivans Cove Citizens Association; and Mr. David Smith, General Manager of Finance, Tasmanian Development Authority (The Mercury; 21/6/88). This Independent Committee did not act as a formal committee. Each member submitted an individual report reflecting their individual expertise (Personal communication, Mr. Ken Hudspeth, 18/10/89).

In June 1988 the Council announced that the three final proposals would be made available for public viewing. The final decision would be made on September 9, 1988 (The Mercury; 21/6/88).

4.4.2.. The Guidelines for the Proposals

The 1987 Council guidelines for the proposals had evolved out of a Bicentennial Civic Square Proposal Brief prepared for the Hobart City Council by Mr. Alf Lester in 1985. He had prepared the Brief for the Bicentennial Proposal along the lines of his 1983 Sullivans Cove Urban Design Study. It was in this original brief that details of the commercial component thought necessary to provide the public amenities were outlined and the suggestion was made that a carefully-placed five-storey building could be accommodated on the site without affecting view lines significantly. The Hobart City Council prepared the subsequent guidelines (Personal communication, Mr. Peter Curtis, 16/10/89). The Council was not going to be bound by the draft planning scheme which recommended that 'any new buildings should maintain or complete the existing two to three-storey 'wall' around the Cove', and which stated that elsewhere in the Sullivans Cove area new buildings should have a maximum of four storeys (The Mercury; 6/7/88). (Refer to Plate 3, p. 49 of Hunter Street illustrating the 'wall around the Cove').

All three developers failed to follow the guidelines. They did not provide an environmental impact statement even though there were five pages in the guidelines outlining the factors that would need to be examined. These included the existing use of the site, road access, and parking on and around the site, pedestrian access, views, and microclimate, including wind factors, shadows from the buildings, and protection from the rain or sun (The Mercury; 9/7/88). All the proposals failed to deliver the required number of carparking spaces and failed to establish a link between the square and the rest of the city. Many people also considered that the plans failed to blend in with the architecture of the area (The Sunday Tasmanian; 10/7/88). Each developer stipulated that the title of the land would go to the developers (The Mercury; 21/7/88).

4.4.3. Public Comment

Public comment on the three shortlisted proposals on display was not slow to arrive. Over 1000 questionnaires were filled in during the first four days of the exhibition. The Town Clerk announced the final figures from a total of 4,669 questionnaires: about 80% favoured the John Holland proposal, 12% the Bond Corporation's, and 8% the Jennings proposal. He said that a significant proportion had indicated they favoured none of the submissions but that their comments indicated that they would favour one of the proposals if modifications were made (The Mercury; 18/8/88). The Tasmanian Conservation Trust claimed 40% of the people wrote on the questionnaires that they preferred none of the proposals even though there was not a 'no development' preference on the questionnaire. The John Holland proposal was nominated as the most acceptable because of its lesser height.

The Lord Mayor assured the public that the Council had not reached a decision and that the option of returning to the drawing board remained. She emphasised that the Council had gone to considerable length to ensure maximum public input (The Mercury; 28/6/88). This was despite comments made by Mr. Barry McNeill, president of the Royal Australian Institute of Architects (Tasmanian Chapter), earlier in the year that the Council had not provided sufficient opportunity for public discussion on the design guidelines for the civic square project and that it would be costly and inefficient if the rules were to be changed at the end of the exercise (The Mercury; 25/3/88).

In a Letter to the Editor (The Mercury; 1/7/88), a reader explained his point of view:

The main problem which the Town Hall is facing at present with its proposed civic square is that it used competitive submissions by commercial interests to seek answers to civic issues which were never properly discussed and articulated in the first place.

4.4.4. The Sullivans Cove Citizens Association (SCCA)

The Sullivans Cove Citizens Association consists of private members and representatives of affiliated organisations. It is recognised by all authorities

associated with planning Sullivans Cove. The Association was formed in 1986 by members of the earlier citizens Committee that arose from a public meeting to express community opinions on the international hotel.

In December 1987 the Sullivans Cove Citizens Association responded to the Hobart City Council's announcement of plans for the development of the civic square. It had recommended that the Council

amend its schedule, accept some delay and permit effective public discussions on its Civic Square proposals before proceeding to the next stage of the planning (The Mercury; 18/12/87).

It called on the Council to inform the public and seek its opinions before competing developers spent time and money on proposals that would inevitably create controversy. It had welcomed the assurance that the public would be invited to comment on the four shortlisted submissions but pointed out that this would be six months after the proposals had been developed.

The Association also outlined several matters of concern (The Mercury; 18/12/87):

1. The Council had rejected the suggestion of a public meeting to explain the project and the Association had been denied access to the guidelines to developers until after the public promotion launch. This happened despite a request early in 1987 to contribute constructively to discussions of proposals before they were implemented rather than criticising them afterwards.
2. Council consultation appeared to be narrowly restricted to authorities such as the State Government, the Marine Board of Hobart, the Sullivans Cove Development Authority and the professional institutes of planners and architects. Civic proposals should be open to citizen contribution.
3. The SCCA was surprised that the guidelines prepared by council seemed to adhere almost totally to the brief outline proposal and freehand sketches of the Sullivans Cove Urban Design Study of 1983, prepared by a mainland consultant.
4. Ratepayers have not been asked whether they would accept the cost through normal financing procedures.

5. The glossy prospectus and the supporting videotape promoted the waterfront site as a target for commercial developers. Only at 'small-print' stage, the guidelines and performance standards prepared by council officers, did the required-for provision of civic amenities appear. The prospectus itself did not mention the civic component.

6. Continuing use of the title 'Civic Square' was misleading and inappropriate.

The Association emphatically recommended to the City Council:

1. That none of the proposed developments - Bond, Jennings or John Holland - be accepted by the Council; and

2. That a moratorium be declared on further major development proposals in the Sullivans Cove precinct and its environs until a cohesive strategy plan for the area had been prepared.

4.4.5. The Hobart City Council's Position.

In August 1988 the Hobart City Council decided in favour of the John Holland Properties proposal on the basis that 72% (the Lord Mayor Doone Kennedy's figure) of the respondents to the council's questionnaire were in favour of the development and that it was the only developer willing to modify its designs. Amended guidelines were subsequently drawn up by the Hobart City Counsellors and submitted to John Holland representatives. Height, form, unsympathetic architecture, loss of views and carparking were all discussed by the Council in the formulation of the new guidelines. The Victorian manager of John Holland, Mr. Jeff Holloway, foresaw no difficulty in amending the design to take account of community concern (The Mercury; 26/8/88).

Almost immediately there were calls for the amended guidelines to be released for public comment. It was suggested that the Council should develop the site itself (The Mercury; 31/8/88). In September 1988 a committee of four aldermen, including Alderman Andrew Hurburgh who had been vocal in his criticisms of the way the previous Civic Square committee had operated, was appointed to negotiate the design of the square with John Holland Properties. The new committee would

consider the objections against the original design and look at ways to make the development more sympathetic with the character of its surroundings (The Mercury; 28/9/88).

In November 1988 John Holland Properties displayed a new model of the development to the Hobart City Council's sub-committee and council technical staff. The development was reduced in mass and had a hip roof configuration (The Mercury; 15/11/88).

In May 1989 it was announced that the 'drastically revised proposal' for the civic square would be finalised at a forthcoming council committee meeting. Alderman Andrew Hurburgh claimed the new submission would be widely accepted because of the 'vigorous planning and development stage and the unprecedented level of public input'. He described the new design by Canberra-based architect-planner Mr. Alf Lester, who he said was recognised as a 'guru of Sullivans Cove', as very attractive and said it 'looked like Hobart'. He also announced that the ownership of the site was to remain Council property (The Mercury; 20/5/89).

A John Holland spokesman later claimed the new proposal contained many of the elements of the previous submission (The Australian; 10-11/6/89). Changes included a greater proportion of public space and increased parking; a reduction in height and bulk by changing the plan into interlinked buildings, and the use of stepped levels and hip roofs to change the lines of the building; and the use of sandstone and other materials from existing historic buildings on the site (which were to be demolished) (The Australian; 24-25/6/89).

In late June 1989, the Hobart City Council approved the new proposal and decided to let it go through the normal planning procedures. The people would decide if the the new design was acceptable. It would go on public display (Personal communication, Mr. Peter Curtis; 16/10/89).

The State Labor Party announced that it would impose a moratorium on all major waterfront development if it formed a government with the Green Independents after the resumption of State Parliament (The Australian; 24-25/6/89). During the Council

meeting of August 29, 1989 the Hobart City Councillors who supported the idea of a moratorium on development in Sullivans Cove lost a vote 5 - 7 that a moratorium should be imposed (The Mercury; 29/8/89).

The new proposal for the civic square development was put on display for public comment from the 7th to the 28th August, 1989. A decision on the development was expected at the September 21 Council meeting. Public debate raged over the plans and the Sullivans Cove Citizens Association held a public forum on August 17, 1989 to gauge public reaction.

4.4.6. The Civic Square Forum - August 17, 1989

The Civic Square Forum was held on August 17, 1989. The importance of the public being informed about development proposals was emphasised and the problems with the John Holland proposal explained. The public had misjudged the ramifications of the lower height. If the height was reduced, the bulk would be increased. The Council was attempting to get civic amenities without civic cost but the contenders were compensating for this civic space by including greater commercial space. After taking a year to modify the original design the developers had not made any substantial changes.

It was suggested that Council 'start again', that the relevant planning schemes be reviewed, and the people of Hobart should be given a chance to define what they wanted for their waterfront. The Forum asked: Did Hobart need a civic square or public space? If so, where and what type? Was Constitution Dock a suitable site? What public activities could it be used for? What other use other than retail and commercial could be developed on that site? Had the closing of the roads been examined properly, taking into account the change in traffic flow? An alternative would be to close the roads for special occasions. What are the public's views on the demolition of the existing buildings? Was it going to be the pride of Hobart?

Aldermen Barry Fisher and Andrew Hurburgh assured those attending that the Council was 'bending over to get it right' but the concept of green grass and trees had gone. The commercial component would make it a busy, active place. Beauty

was in the eye of the beholder and differences of opinion were expected. The Council was still responding as best it could to useful, intelligent input. Everyone wanted the best result for the citizens of Hobart. Council was open to the appreciation of the problems but the 'buck' stopped at the Aldermen and the Planning Appeals Board. The Aldermen needed input and courage to make the decisions.

Alderman Hurburgh pointed out that this meeting was a learning experience for the Council in that it was the first time Council had gone to the public and said, 'What do you think?' He pointed out that people do not use the Cove because of the hostile climate. What was needed was a warm, friendly sheltered space. Historically it was a commercial site and this use was being renewed. Hobart had a lot of parks and space that were not used and in this case commercialism and public space fitted together. Council wanted to hear the public's views and involve them in public projects.

The representative for John Holland and architect for the development, Mr. Alf Lester, commented that he respected legitimate concern and was sensitive to the opportunity to hear public opinion. The proposal had taken a large amount of thought and he felt that the quay had given the civic square concept an identity which would attract locals and tourists and which could be used as a forum for artistic expression and creative pursuits as well as for maritime architecture. He commented that this development was enjoying the most exhaustive public participation he had ever experienced.

The audience of about 200 was assured by the Councillors that there was no commitment to develop the site. If the development was approved there were tight guidelines on the title to the building, possible redevelopment in 30-40 years and the return of ownership to Council after 99 years.

The Civic Square Forum seemed to act as a catalyst for opposition to the proposed civic square. Increased and continued opposition was reflected in Letters to the

Editor in the The Mercury newspaper especially, and calls for a moratorium on development in the Cove.

4.4.7. The John Holland Properties Pty. Ltd. Position

On September 14, 1989, John Holland Properties Pty. Ltd. announced that it would scrap its plans for the civic square and go back to the drawing board. John Holland Properties decided to withdraw its proposal before it could be voted on by the Hobart City Council during the September 21 Council meeting as 'it felt it was inappropriate to put the Council in an invidious position of voting against a proposal in which it had invested a great deal of time and energy' (The Mercury; 14/9/89).

Mr. Grant Archibald, John Holland properties Chief Executive, said the decision was in response to a groundswell of opposition to its proposal. He believed the initial design guidelines were too rigid and fixed and he was seeking to reenter negotiations with the Council to have the guidelines relaxed to allow it to design a proposal which would take into account the will and wishes of the public (The Mercury; 14/9/89). He emphasised that John Holland Properties had not pulled out altogether as it was the preferred developer and the Council had a commitment to use the company for the civic square development (ABC Radio; 15/9/89).

4.5. Summary of the Hobart Civic Square Case Study

The history of events for the Hobart Civic Square case study is far more complex than that for the Sheraton International Hotel. In contrast with the Sheraton International Hotel, the Hobart Civic Square concept evolved out of community expectations and its development was a culmination of events over a long time period. These events included relevant background planning studies as well as the development of a multi-functional concept for the square during the 1980s.

In 1986 the Hobart City Council announced its decision to establish a multi-million dollar waterfront Civic Square development which would incorporate a commercial component as well as public facilities. The multifunctional concept combined with

some public facilities was proposed in both the 1979 Sullivans Cove Study and the 1983 Sullivans Cove Urban Design Study, neither of which included widespread public comment. The Hobart City Council appeared to rely on these two studies for justification for the concept of the Civic Square, rather than risking a repeat of the 1974 design competition. No public comment was invited or heeded at this stage of the decisionmaking process.

The Hobart City Council and the State Government negotiated with the Hobart Marine Board for a \$250,000 land swap to extend the Civic Square site to the water and dock edge. The land swap aroused considerable controversy. No public input had been invited and no details of the lengthy decisionmaking process were made available.

The Hobart City Council relied on the recommendations of the 1983 Sullivans Cove Urban Design Study and the subsequent Bicentennial Square Proposal Brief in preparing the 1987 Guidelines and Performance Standards for the proposed Civic Square development. The Sullivans Cove Citizens Association and other professional groups were informed of the Standards before the competition was announced and were invited to a confidential briefing, but were allowed no input.

Twelve civic square proposals were entered in the competition. Four were shortlisted by Hobart City Council officers. The Hobart City Council announced that these proposals were to be considered by three relevant City Council committees, a special advisory body and the public before going to Council for a final decision. There was no information or explanation of what factors would be taken into account or how any public comment would be considered.

The Hobart City Council found itself in a difficult position as both landlord and the planning body making the decision on the development. The Council, as landlord, was involved in long, protracted tenure negotiations and allowed no public input into its role as developer of the Civic Square site. Formal participation procedures on planning matters were to be the only opportunity for the public to have its say.

One of the four shortlisted proposals was withdrawn. Of the three proposals which produced concepts for the Civic Square, none adhered to the Guidelines and Performance Standards for the development, none provided an environmental impact statement, kept to height restrictions or provided the minimum number of carparking spaces.

The Guidelines and Performance Standards were not released for public scrutiny prior to, or during the time for the public to comment on the development proposals. The public had to choose between the three proposals presented to them. There was no option to reject all.

The public appeared to choose the John Holland Properties proposal which was least in height. According to the Hobart City Council estimates at the time, 72% or 80% (both figures were quoted) of people responding to the questionnaire chose the John Holland proposal. Of these, 40% indicated on the questionnaire that they preferred none of the proposals.

After the time elapsed for public comment the Hobart City Council announced the John Holland Properties proposal as the preferred development. In fact, John Holland Properties was the only developer willing to modify the design, and go ahead without pre-commitments to the proposed office space within the development.

The Hobart City Council appointed an aldermanic committee to negotiate modifications suggested by the public reactions to the John Holland Properties proposal. The developers proved unwilling to make extensive changes to the design. The Hobart City Council decided to let the public decide if the modifications were adequate and organised another public exhibition showing the original John Holland proposal and the modified one. The modified proposal showed little change from the original design.

The aldermanic committee provided for no public input. The negotiations entered into by the committee with the developer were not entirely related to planning matters. Council, as the landowner, still had tenure and development details to sort out with the developer and these appeared to take priority over planning matters.

The Sullivans Cove Citizens Association held a Civic Forum which came out against the modified design. At the public meeting, the developers, Council and the public were invited to participate and express their respective views.

Again, a public meeting proved to be the catalyst for opposition to a development in the Sullivans Cove precinct. The questions asked at the Civic Square public meeting highlighted the lack of information released and discussed by the Hobart City Council, the lack of flexibility in the Council's decisionmaking processes, and its ignorance of public participation techniques. The public's reaction was to call for a moratorium on the Civic Square proposal and on all development in the Cove until a strategy plan was prepared.

John. Holland Properties withdrew their proposal soon after this meeting. They claimed the initial guidelines were the cause of the public's rejection of their design. They called for new guidelines that incorporated public input.

In both the Sheraton International Hotel and Hobart Civic Square developments the public was given the opportunity to comment only on what the government and planners had conceptualised beforehand. There was little or no effort to find out what the public wanted. In the case of the Sheraton International Hotel the final result was a compromise in design, but the Hobart Civic Square was postponed.

4.6. Analysis of Participation.

The Hobart Civic Square was to have been a showpiece in public participation for the Hobart City Council. The Hobart Civic Square development would not emulate the International Hotel public participation 'debacle'. There would be opportunities for formal public participation.

There was no public input into the original multi-functional design concept, the guidelines or the choice of the shortlisted proposals. Although the public was able to participate in the final choice, the guidelines were not made available to enable informed comment on the three designs. Although the public indicated its preference for the John Holland proposal, it had little effect on the final decision. The Council's

'preferred' developer, John Holland Properties, was the only one willing to modify its design after the public participation process.

The public was expected to accept very minor modifications to the original design as proof that its participation had made a difference. No formal public input had been allowed into the revised guidelines and the developers withdrew the development before public comment could be assessed or incorporated into the modified proposal.

Once again, the public was invited to 'participate in participation' which complied to Arnstein's definition of consultation. The Hobart City Council assured the public that their concerns and ideas would be taken into consideration. This assurance elevated participation in this project to Arnstein's level of placation. Arnstein defined placation as consultation with some degree of influence. It appeared as the fourth rung on her eight rung 'Ladder'. She regarded this level of participation as 'tokenism' because the authority still retained the right to make the final decision (Arnstein, 1969; p. 219).

Burke's review and comment category, in which public comment is invited but no commitment is made by the planning authority to alter or modify the plan, is applicable to the Civic Square proposal. The Council did exercise its right to take public comment into account and asked the developer to modify its design. Unfortunately, the Council prepared the guidelines for the modification without public participation. Thus the level of participation was not elevated to Burke's next category of consultation, in which public representatives were recruited and their specific advice sought (Burke, 1979; pp. 74-75).

The minor modifications made by the developer were a reflection of the revised guidelines. These revised guidelines may have concentrated on other constraints, such as financial matters, rather than planning or public input. The developers withdrew their revised proposal after the public meeting called in response to the modified design and requested that the guidelines be 'relaxed' to allow the proposal to take account of public opinion. This 'relaxation' could have boosted the participation process to a level involving a transfer of decisionmaking power from the Hobart City Council to the public.

The participation process appeared to conform to Glass' information exchange theory as evidenced by the presence of developer and Council representatives at the public meeting called by the Sullivans Cove Citizens Association. Glass' theory assumed the developing authority would initiate this exchange. In fact the action group brought the parties together for the purposes of 'sharing ideas and concerns' (Glass, 1979; p. 182).

The result of this public meeting was a call, by the Sullivans Cove Citizens Association, for a moratorium on all development in the Cove. Soon after the public meeting developer withdrew its proposal. By bringing the planners and the public together for the purpose of 'sharing ideas and concerns' the Sullivans Cove Citizens Association highlighted obvious problems not previously acknowledged by the Council. Knowledge of public sentiment appeared to be a significant factor in the withdrawal of the proposal by the developers, although it is unknown what other factors were operating to precipitate the withdrawal. Information was exchanged but was not planner initiated as intended by Glass' objective.

The withdrawal of the proposal was an unsatisfactory result for all concerned. The idea for a civic square for Hobart had been around for a very long time. The public appeared to support the concept of the Civic Square and would have embraced the opportunity to participate in the development of an acceptable design. This was shown by the enthusiastic response to the 1974 design competition and the response to the invitation to participate in the latter stages of the John Holland proposal. The public participation process offered by the Hobart City Council in the Hobart Civic Square development was a consumerist public relations exercise as described by Hambleton (1988; p. 125) with no actual transfer of decisionmaking power.

Chapter 5: CONCLUSION.

5.1. Discussion

Public participation in the decisionmaking processes of the two cases studies in Sullivans Cove was the responsibility of the Hobart City Council. The State Government openly admitted during the Sheraton International Hotel debate that it did not have the mechanisms to cope with public participation. When pressured by the public for input it handed the problem to the Hobart City Council.

The Hobart City Council accepted the responsibility with some conditions. It limited its involvement in the Sheraton debate by ensuring that it could not be held to its own Planning Scheme's statement on Sullivans Cove as a conservation zone and requested that the State Government legislate to fast-track the development. In contrast, the Hobart Civic Square proposal was a Hobart City Council inspired development and was its own responsibility.

Public participation in the Hobart Civic Square development was promoted by the Hobart City Council as the antithesis of the Sheraton International Hotel development. The Council announced there would be ample opportunity for the public to participate in the Civic Square proposal, unlike the Sheraton International Hotel debate. In reality, the two case studies were very similar.

Similarities and differences in the progress of both developments are apparent when examining Table 1. In both case studies four design proposals were shortlisted with no public input into the choice of designs or their original briefing documents. Following the selection of a winning design, no real public participation was allowed in either project's respective revised guidelines despite the initial impetus for modifications coming from public reaction.

The Hobart City Council did not release information that may have influenced public comment in either case study. The International Hotel's Site Development Brief and the Civic Square's Guidelines and Performance Standards were not made available to the public. No public education was attempted to help people make informed

decisions on the proposals and in neither case did public opinion make a further difference to the final design that was put on display.

Table 1: The Major Stages in each Case Study (The occurrence or not of formal public participation procedures shown as pp or no pp)

<u>Sheraton International Hotel</u>	<u>Hobart Civic Square</u>
Guidelines for development (no pp)	Guidlines for development (no pp)
4 Shortlisted designs (no pp)	4 Shortlisted designs (no pp)
Winner chosen (no pp)	Winner chosen (pp)
Public Meeting	Revised guidelines (no pp)
Revised guidelines (no pp)	Modified development on public display (pp)
Compromise development on public display (pp)	Public meeting
Modified design accepted by Hobart City Council	Modified design withdrawn by the developer
Fast-track legislation introduced by the State Government	

The differences in the progress of the two developments occur on two occasions. The public was involved in choosing the winning design of the Civic Square but not the International Hotel. The Sheraton International Hotel proposal's fast-track legislation secured a positive outcome for the State Government by preventing the right of appeal. The modified International hotel proposal therefore proceeded without further delays. The Hobart Civic Square development was not subject to fast-track legislation. It may be assumed that had the developer not withdrawn, delays could have been anticipated due to public appeals.

The public's reaction to the State Government's International Hotel proposal was to give a mandate to the Sullivans Cove Citizens Committee. This Committee was made up of professional people, particularly architects and planners, various organisations and the public. The Committee achieved limited access to information not made available to the general public and was vocal in its criticisms and suggestions for improvements to the design. This community involvement affected the outcome but only to the extent that the original proposal was redesigned.

The public's reaction to the Hobart City Council's Civic Square proposal was to give a mandate to the Sullivans Cove Citizens Association which had evolved from the previous Sullivans Cove Citizens Committee. As in the International Hotel case study, this group gained access to information not released to the general public and was consulted during the redesign stages, but it did not obviously effect the outcome to any degree.

From the administrative perspective, the formal public participation processes were used as information exchange and possibly as a technique to build support for the developments. At no stage in either case study did the Hobart City Council or the State Government appear to make genuine attempts to educate the public. They did not use participation as a planning tool. They did not even attempt to coopt their most vocal critics the Sullivans Cove Citizens Committee or the Sullivans Cove Citizens Association. Its public relations efforts to convince the public that it was being taken into account could have been related to Hambleton's consumerism approach.

The respective claims by the State Government and the Hobart City Council that the public had had adequate input to the International Hotel proposal, and that the public had had unprecedented and vigorous input which resulted in a drastically revised Civic Square proposal, did not hold up under examination. It would appear that the State Government and the Hobart City Council are relatively ignorant of public participation techniques. They mistook media attention for public input.

From the public's perspective, in both cases, the Council barely met Burke's requirements for review and comment, whilst its efforts can be found at the lower levels of Arnstein's Ladder of Citizen Participation. The public was given the right to be heard but not heeded in the International Hotel proposal whereas the Hobart Civic Square proposal was only marginally above this level of consultation. The Council assurances that the public would be heeded raised the participation to the level of placation. Both levels of consultation and placation were regarded by Arnstein as tokenism. In neither case was the public or the action groups representing it given the power to ensure their views were heard.

Of the four main theorists discussed in the Literature Review only Arnstein's criteria and description of public participation was sensitive enough to detect a difference in the level of participation seen in these two developments. It would appear that Arnstein's criteria, although developed over twenty years ago, has not yet been superseded as the definitive work on the assessment of the effectiveness of public participation.

The Literature Review outlined some of the history and theories behind the development of public participation. In the United States participation was developed through urban renewal and poverty programs. In Britain consumerism, decentralisation and the extension of local democracy all concentrated on the disadvantaged public requiring services from government institutions. The Australian situation reflected the urban renewal problems found in the United States.

The Sheraton International Hotel and the Hobart Civic Square developments were not aimed at providing a service for the poor. They were elite developments aimed at making money. The civic component of the Hobart Civic Square was an 'add-on' to a primarily commercial development. The Government, in the Sheraton International Hotel case, and the Hobart City Council, in the Civic Square case, should have treated their developments as special cases requiring special attention from both the institution's and public's perspective. Massive resources, complicated decisions and a reluctance to release information were features of both the case studies. Public reaction was noted but was not used in the decisionmaking process. The argument

that public comment did not have enough weight of persuasion is not relevant here. There was no lack of expertise in the Sullivans Cove citizens groups commenting on the developments. According to the Literature Review they should have been heeded as they had expertise and knowledge relevant to the developments.

The State Government could not use the threat of withdrawal of support to control the action group in the Sheraton International Hotel case study, because it hadn't allowed for its participation in the first place or given it support. Likewise in the Hobart Civic Square case study, the action group was not acknowledged to the extent that withdrawal of Council support would have made a difference to the outcome of the decisionmaking process. The action groups were consulted during the redesign stages of both developments but had no actual input.

In these two case studies there appeared to be no real advantages for either the public or the authority in allowing public participation during the latter stages of the processes except as a placation exercise. In the International Hotel case the public comment on the compromise design made no difference to the State Government actions. In the Civic Square case the developers withdrew after the civic forum came out against the redesigned civic square but there is some doubt that it withdrew solely because of public opinion.

In neither case was the public asked what it wanted. It was invited to comment at the end of the design process. Ideally the public should have been invited to comment at the very beginning before the guidelines for either development were prepared. This may have saved considerable expense on the developers's side and ill-will on the public's side.

The Literature Review described claims that institutionalised participation tended to favour the institution and that outcomes were not changed, only the peripheral details. This was not supported by the Sullivans Cove case studies. The Sheraton International Hotel was exempted from the normal planning processes through legislation and the public lost its right to appeal the final 'compromise' development. The public affected the outcome of the original design quite dramatically by forcing a

change in the 'landmark' concept and design. The Hobart Civic Square proposal was withdrawn by the developers after public sentiment was voiced at a public meeting, not through formal participation procedures. The public, through formal processes, was only able to affect peripheral details of the winning design.

Institutionalised public participation should be encouraged to satisfy participatory democratic pressures but its acceptance by the authorities should not prevent the development of mechanisms to deal with other participatory modes which may arise from time to time, such as the public meetings in both case studies. It has been suggested by the Victorian Council of Social Service, in a different context, that a dynamic theory which accepts both confrontation and consensus strategies in varying degrees, for different situations, or at different phases in the one situation should be encouraged and developed (Victorian Council of Social Services, 1981; p. 49).

The first hypothesis stated:

The public has had little input into decisionmaking in the planning of new development in Sullivans Cove, despite appearances and an apparent willingness by authorities to improve public participation opportunities in response to pressure.

The authorities did not improve public participation in response to pressure. In both cases the public was invited to comment on the final modified development. In neither case was there going to be an opportunity for the public comment to make an effect on the displayed design.

In the Sheraton International Hotel case study the legislation prevented further public participation. The authorities can be said to have improved public participation opportunities because the procedure was changed from no participation to a participation opportunity in the final 'compromise' design but no comments were heeded from this formal public participation opportunity.

There was little improvement in the Civic Square case study. Public participation was invited on the shortlisted proposals and the final modified design. The developer

withdrew after the public meeting convened by the Sullivans Cove Citizens Association, not after the formal participation opportunity. The public meeting was called in response to the very minor changes made to the original design. It had become obvious to the Sullivans Cove Citizens Association that formal participation had had little effect in changing the original design.

There were was only one formal participation opportunity given in the Sheraton International Hotel case study and two in the Hobart Civic Square study. The demands for changes in the designs were effective only outside the formal participation process offered by the Hobart City Council. In both cases the impetus for change was brought by public meetings. There was little public input to decisionmaking in the planning of new development except through these public meetings which were unrelated to the formal processes. The authorities' perceived willingness to improve public participation opportunities was predominately rhetoric, unaccompanied by their definition of public participation. The appearance of effective public participation is questioned in both these cases.

The second hypothesis stated:

In line with Sandercock's (1978) arguments that the process may be more important than the product, authorities concerned with Sullivans Cove are ill-informed and unnecessarily defensive about real improvements in public participation, as people generally only want to be informed and 'have a ready opportunity to complain'.

Sandercock canvassed for the need for an open planning process which humanised the bureaucratic system but argued against any devolution of power. An open planning process would ideally make planning information readily available to the public by taking it to the people rather than expecting the people to find it. Implementing techniques to facilitate public access to information would allow people to feel their opinions mattered and their lack of particular expertise was not a handicap. They may then be satisfied with access to the information and 'an opportunity to complain'. This was unable to be tested as information about the developments was not made readily available to the public.

The link between the level of expertise and input heeded needs to be broken. Planners must want to humanise the system. The ramification of not providing easy access to information, and giving the public an opportunity to complain, is that the planners are pushing the public into the arms of other experts. In Hobart the public is giving local planners and architects, not employed by the authorities, mandates to represent it, thereby allowing 'expertise' to stay the overriding factor in public participation processes. The public has created minor elite organisations by giving its support to these local 'experts'.

These Sullivans Cove organisations do not follow the accepted theory as presented in current public participation literature. They did not appear to become short of resources, they appeared very unified in their stances, they were not coopted by the authorities or obviously manipulated or exploited for their skills, and they kept pressure on the authorities for a sustained period of time. They were consulted by the authorities on at least two occasions.

The reluctance of the authorities to share decisionmaking power with these groups was the core dilemma for both in the Sullivans Cove examples. The developing authorities were hindered by the minor elite organisations with resulting cost escalations and project delays. The people involved in the minor elite organisations had to be dissatisfied with the outcome of their involvement. Future developments may be at greater risk of opposition from such organisations as their involvement is likely to be increasingly aggressive and negative.

Churchman's research discussed the personal benefits people could gain from participating. She did not discuss professionals or minor elite groups. Professionals and professionally orientated groups would be less content with limits on the type of participation offered to them or by a lack of influence in the decisionmaking than individuals 'attempting to have a say'. The Hobart groups wanted to change the structure of decisionmaking process and had high expectations of competence and control of that process. Satisfaction was related to influencing the decisionmaking process and the quality of the environment, contrary to Churchman's findings which emphasised the importance of the process rather than the end product. It can be

suggested that the people in these action groups did not need to develop personal self-esteem or confidence from the process, or would have been particularly supportive of the Council's 'preferred' development just because they were part of the participation process.

The third hypothesis stated:

The reluctance of authorities to grant real improvements in public participation may be explained by a fear that to go a little further may increase the community's understanding to a degree that a different kind of participation is actually demanded: beyond simply having a say in a decision here and there to a questioning of democratic processes in development decisionmaking, that is, to a situation where the wider community itself wants to set goals for development, thereby widening democratic processes and seeking powersharing.

This hypothesis is upheld in both case studies as evidenced by the evolution of the minor elite organisations which have the support of the public. This is illustrated in Hobart by the progression of the single issue Sullivans Cove Citizens Committee to the multi-issue Sullivans Cove Citizens Association and subsequently to the Citizens for Hobart group which claims an interest in planning and development throughout the greater Hobart environs not exclusively in Sullivans Cove. As predicted by the Alinsky model, the partial success in the Sheraton International Hotel controversy had been sufficient to maintain the Committee's momentum.

There is no discussion in the literature relating the early involvement of minor elite groups in the participation process to their subsequent evolution. It is only conjecture that had the Sullivans Cove Citizens Committee/Association been involved early, its momentum would have subsided before extending its range of interests, as is presently occurring. Minor elite groups are questioning democratic processes in decisionmaking and are seeking powersharing regardless of Council granting 'any' improvements in public participation.

These groups need further investigation and analysis as they are emerging as the trend in public participation for the 1990s. Improving levels of education occurring in

most Western countries are encouraging the formation of minor elite groups not only interested in environmental issues. This represents the challenge for the 1990s - how can authorities accommodate the views of these educated minority groups?

5.2. Recommendations

There are several factors that need to be fulfilled before effective change can occur in the administration, application and acceptance of institutionalised public participation. The most important is the political will to change. The people who wish to participate must be included early in the process and have their concerns fully recognised by the authority. This may reduce public pressure at a later stage in development with the consequent reduction in development costs caused by delays. It is in the interests of the institution to encourage public participation from an early stage in a development and it would appear to be in the interests of the public to use whatever method is offered.

Lobbying, participating in institutionalised procedures and using confrontationist methods are all techniques available to the public. For the participant there is no guarantee that any one tactic will work. For example, joining an action group will show solidarity with a cause but its involvement may not change the final outcome. One of the most important ingredients for successful change is the attention of the media. If the outcome of an institution's decisionmaking process is to be changed by public input, dynamic and flexible approaches toward the institution and the media from the participating public seem necessary.

The Tasmanian State Government should rectify its lack of public participation mechanisms. Planning legislation should be introduced to allow formal participation structures to be developed. Participation should be encouraged at the beginning of the planning process before too much money is spent on any one plan. Ideally the initial briefs should incorporate public input as this is the basis on which developers put their tenders. Some onus should be put on developers to incorporate public participation in their designs. Formal planning legislation would help this occur. A

levy imposed on potential developers to recoup costs incurred during this briefing phase would seem appropriate.

Planning legislation should also remedy the lack of public participation in the preparation of planning documents. Participants were invited to respond to the final stages of the various planning documents prepared on Sullivans Cove during the 1970s and 1980s. However, public participation was not extensive and did not play a significant role in the final drafts. The overseas experience, revealed a tendency for small public responses to such studies with few comments producing any noticeable difference. This is reflected in the Tasmanian situation. The wider public was not aware of its opportunity to comment and any comment required considerable personal effort of the part of the respondent in obtaining relevant documents and appropriate forms for comment.

Additionally, as presented in the Literature Review, participation at the final stages of the planning process was ineffective because planners had developed preconceptions regarding the completed draft. They tended to react only to perceived expertise, with public facilities and recreation issues being the least affected by participants comments. Long (1975; p. 97) claimed that planning officers were guilty of discrimination in favour of people who already had access to channels of power, authority and influence. This supports the recommendation that the public be involved in the preparation stage of the planning documents before preconceptions are in place and before expertise is perceived to be paramount.

The Sheraton International Hotel and the Hobart Civic Square were developments that caused considerable community debate. The case studies provided historical data for the thesis and related the public participation processes to the decisionmaking processes. The significant factor highlighted by this study is the role of minor elite groups. In both case studies, minor elite groups were given a mandate by the public to represent them. They played a dominant role in criticising the developments and continue to demand a greater role in decisionmaking. The role of minor elite organisations has not been examined in detail by contemporary authors.

The significance of their potential role was only alluded to by Alterman, Harris and Hill (1984; p. 183). This appears to be a major deficiency in the knowledge of public participation methods. More research needs to be undertaken to further understand the development, evolution and role of minor elite groups in planning and wider environmental issues.

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